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AFTER THE VERDICT: DISPOSITIONAL DECISIONS
REGARDING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS ACQUITTED BY
REASON OF INSANITY
Samuel Jan Brakel*
INTRODUCTION

The insanity defense has been a topic of much controversy since its
conception and earliest application.' Periodically the controversy has been
intensified when the defense is invoked in notorious criminal cases. At such
times, long standing academic doubts about the defense, both conceptual
and practical, are brought into public focus. John Hinckley's case is the
most recent such instance of national note. 2 The product of these periodic
* Jan Brakel, Davidson College, N.C., A.B. 1965; University of Chicago Law School,
J.D. 1968, was a research attorney with the American Bar Foundation when he wrote this
Article. He is the author, with John Parry and Barbara Weiner, of THE MENTALLY DISABLED
AND THE LAW (Chicago: American Bar Foundation 1985). Mr. Brakel is currently teaching at
Northern Illinois University College of Law and acting as Senior Consultant to the Isaac Ray

Center.
Funding support for the research on which this Article is based came from the American
Bar Endowment, the Foundation's primary funding source, and from the Lloyd A. Fry
Foundation, the Maryland Bar Foundation, and the Borg-Warner Foundation. Thanks go to
assistants Tim Bell and Joe Podwika, who helped with the research, and to Ray Sokolowski
for a very careful editing job.
1. There is a bit of a revisionist trend in recent writings on the subject that, while continuing
to acknowledge the philosophic and symbolic importance of the insanity defense in the scheme
of criminal justice, goes to some lengths to downplay its practical significance by citing the
small number of defendants who raise the defense and the even smaller percentage who succeed
with it. See, e.g., Steadman, Monahan, Hartstone, Davis & Robbins, Mentally Disordered
Offenders: A National Survey of Patients and Facilities,6 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31, 33 (1982)

(estimating that in 1978 some 1,625 defendants were placed in mental institutions because they
had been found not guilty by reason of insanity and contrasting this figure with the 6,420
defendants institutionalized because of their incompetency to stand trial).
2. Mention of this case, United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Supp. 1342 (D.D.C. 1981), is
de rigueurin today's writings on the insanity defense. An introductory footnote to the discussion
of the insanity defense in J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEtNER, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND
m LAW 707 n.186 (1985), sums up the scope and amount of legislative activity in the wake
of Hinckley:

Following the Hinckley decision, 27 bills were introduced in the United States
Congress to abolish the insanity defense or to change it, and numerous state
legislatures changed or considered changing their laws, The Subcommittee on Criminal Law of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings two days after the verdict.
Limiting the Insanity Defense: Hearings on S. 818, S. 1106, S. 1558, S. 1995, S.
2572, S. 2658, & S. 2669 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982). Legislatures in Alabama,
Alaska, Delaware, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, among others, introduced bills to
change the insanity defense or to adopt a guilty but mentally ill verdict.
Id.
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raisings of the public consciousness is often more heat than light. Large
amounts of intellectual energy get spent dragging not-so-new ideas over yet
older ground. Some of that energy goes toward rekindling the idle hope that

a foolproof test can be found that will separate once and for all the culpable
bad from the exculpable mad. New definitions of insanity and elaborations

on its requisite effects on the mental capacity of the offender at the time of
the crime are proposed.' Other efforts focus on the interstitial matter of
rearranging the various procedural rights and burdens affected when the
defense is asserted. 4 Yet other reformist eggs are placed in the intellectual
basket of alternatives to the insanity verdict option, though neither recent
nor more distant experience holds out much promise that these new options
(some being just old ones newly dyed) will make "the difference.", Finally,

a host of new voices is added to the chorus that for generations has been
calling, with varying resonance, for total abolition of the defense, notwithstanding the fact that both historical reality and logic indicate that abolishing
the defense would fail to' dispose of the essential state-of-mind conundrum
6
in criminal cases.
In the midst of the various ups and downs of public awareness and
intellectual mood surrounding the insanity defense, a central question endures, the resolution of which is particularly resistant to the legal tinkering
that accompanies these ephemeral states: what should the state do with
persons who succeed in "getting off" by way of the defense, or its alter-

3. If there is any consensus at all among the leading thinkers on the subject, it is that
such a foolproof test is out of reach. Continual disagreement and changing alignments on any
of the presently operating tests of insanity underscore this basic fact of legal life. Large questions
persist about whether the different formulations even have an affect on the ultimate court or
jury decisions. See, e.g., R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY (1967).
4. See J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 719-25 for a detailed discussion
of procedural issues surrounding the insanity defense and recent recommendations for change.
5. For example, the insanity plea was recently eliminated as an affirmative defense in
Idaho, Montana, and Utah. IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 4614-201 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (Supp. 1987). Expert testimony regarding the
defendant's mental state remains admissible on the issue of criminal intent in these jurisdictions.
Id. This leaves these jurisdictions with a scheme that is not unlike the "diminished capacity"
defense, which has been tried as an alternative doctrine conjointly with traditional insanity in
several jurisdictions, but without evidence that it yielded the desired results. The short history
of the new Guilty-But-Mentally-1ll (GBMI) verdict option, which today is available along with
the traditional Not-Guilty-By-Reason-of-Insanity (NGRI) verdict in twelve states, is no more
promising. Analyses of the evidence so far suggest that the GBMI alternative apparently selects
a group of offenders who previously would have been convicted, but that: (1) the treatment of
this group is not much different or better than that accorded to convicted offenders; and (2)
there is little, if any, effect on the numbers of offenders who plead insanity or on their
subsequent disposition. See J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 714-16 (citations
to empirical studies); McGraw, Farthing-Capowich & Keilitz, The "Guilty But Mentally Ill"
Plea and Verdict: Current State of the Knowledge, 30 VnL. L. REv. 117, 122 n.21 (1985).
6. See J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 716-17. See also supra note
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natives, as Hinckley did? 7 The point of this Article is to address the issues
surrounding the post-verdict treatment of so called "insanity acquittees:"
where to place them; when, by what criteria, and on what conditions to
discharge them; and whether and how to monitor their behavior after
discharge. Each state has statutory law on -this issue, although some states
have far more elaborate and more up-to-date laws than other states. There
are also a number of model statutes on the subject, promulgated by agencies
oriented toward interstate legal reform and uniformity. There is a growing
amount of case law covering the main issues and various subissues, including
opinions that address the problem in terms of its constitutional dimensions.
Finally, a few jurisdictions have well established, visible programs designed
to implement laws controlling the post-verdict handling of insanity acquittees.
This Article examines the statutes, cases, programs, and scattered analyses
of the programs' results. There will be particular emphasis on laws that
represent the latest trend in this area. The empirical evidence available to
date also will be analyzed, especially for what that evidence can or cannot
tell about the practical effectiveness of these modern statutory solutions.
This Article represents a necessary first step toward deciding whether, and
how, to conduct further studies on dispositional alternatives for insanity

acquittees .8
I.

THE STATUTORY SCHEMES

The law governing the post-verdict treatment of insanity acquittees springs
from two basic concerns-one concern derives from legal principle, the other
is rooted more in human reality-which are to some degree in tension if not
in direct conflict with one another. One side recognizes that legally, the
defendant has been found sick rather than guilty and hence needs, or is
entitled to, treatment rather than punishment. Punishment in this sense
includes either outright penal incarceration or indeterminate and possibly
life long commitment to the locked wards of a hospital for the criminally
insane or some other euphemistically labeled institution where little or no
mental treatment is offered. The other side recognizes the reality of the
criminal action, which is that the criminal charge against the defendant and
the natural presumption of dangerousness that flows from that charge produces understandable uneasiness about dispositional decisions where amenability to treatment is the only consideration and quick discharge, with scarce
attention to general societal interests, is a possible consequence. The temper

7. Steadman, in a recent article, Insanity Defense Research and Treatment of Insanity
Acquittees, 3 BEnAv. Sci. & LAW 37 (1985), has labeled legal change in the post-verdict handling
of insanity acquittees "disposition" or "back-end" reform, to distinguish it from "adjudicative"
reform made at the "front end" of the insanity defense process. Some states have attempted
what he calls "combination" reform, a term that should need no further explanation.
8. This is the agenda that underlies the writing of this Article. The funding provided for
it by the agencies listed in the headnote was specifically designated to support preliminary
research that would lay the groundwork for further study on the model dispositional programs.
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of recent times is to put the stress on human reality 9 and on protecting
society. This emphasis results in diminished concern over whether or not
persons acquitted by reason of insanity, who are after all only technically
innocent as the common citizen would see it, wind up confined without
appropriate treatment or for a longer time than necessary.
The modern statutes reflect these twin concerns. In preparation for the
statutory analysis, my research assistants and I constructed a chart tabulating
the relevant provisions of each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia, plus those of two model acts, one sponsored by the American Bar
Association (ABA Standards), the other by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. The fact that the chart in its final
form comprised 105 columns attests to the level of detail of some of the
state statutory schemes on the post-verdict treatment of insanity acquittees.
For most states, however, there were entries for fewer than half of the
columns. Both the length of the chart and its numerous empty spaces preclude
its presentation here. The act of putting it together, however, was a profitable
analytic exercise that helped a great deal in writing this Article.
A.

Dispositional Provisions-General Alternatives

The laws dealing with insanity acquittees are, for purposes of discussion,
most usefully divided into two major sections: those provisions having to
do with the disposition of the acquittee; and those governing release, prototypically after a period of commitment as opposed to immediately following
the verdict. We start with the former.
By law and logic, a defendant acquitted by reason of insanity has not
been found guilty and can in theory go free. As recently as ten to fifteen
years ago, however, the vast majority of states had statutes providing for
mandatory, or automatic, commitment to a hospital facility for any such
acquittee. 10 This mandatory commitment precluded applying the legal logic
of immediate release. Recent reform efforts have resulted in the repeal of
these automatic commitment provisions in most states and they survive in
only some jurisdictions," leaving the present law in what might be viewed

9. The American Bar Association's CRnINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS (ABA
Standing Committee on Association Standards for Criminal Justice, August, 1984 Draft)
[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS], whose provisions relevant to the topic of this Article are discussed
at various points in the text, are a good reflection of this temper. They are in several respects
more prosecution oriented than one would have expected in an earlier, more permissive era
from such a "progressive" undertaking, which this and other standard-setting efforts invariably
aspire to be.
10. See J. BRAKEL & R. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 430-40 (1971) (Table
11.1, "Insanity as a Defense to Crime" and "Disposition" columns).
11. Statutes providing for automatic commitment of acquittees: CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-8105(4) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257c(a) (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §
24-301(d)(1) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(1) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 654 (West Supp. 1987) (if acquitted in a capital case); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 103
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as a state of higher theoretical purity. That of course, does not mean that
the present law really contemplates, much less demands, the immediate and
automatic release of all persons acquitted of crime by reason of insanity.
The modern disposition laws merely put the enduring societal safety concern
into a different perspective. The currently prevailing statutes, while abjuring
automatic confinement, provide for the acquittee's commitment on one or
two specifically enumerated grounds that are quite readily, if not automatically, provable.
Where automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal is not the
law, the same end can, as indicated above, be accomplished through one or
more of three alternate statutory routes. Under one scheme, the criminal
court can, based on relevant facts developed at the criminal trial, make a
separate decision to commit the acquittee immediately after the verdict. By
the second route, which is favored today in an increasing number of states,
the criminal court can hold a special hearing to consider evidence, often
developed during a special evaluation period or via a special evaluation
procedure, specifically on the point of the acquittee's present committability.
The third alternative is to commit the acquitee via regular civil proceedings,
conducted not by the criminal trial court but by a civil court that normally
handles these matters, such as the probate court, where the acquittee occupies
a legal position identical to that of any other person proposed for institutionalization. In general, these commitment options for insanity acquittees
are not mutually exclusive since two or even all three routes are available in
a number of states.12

(1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(2) (Vernon 1987); NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.521(1) (1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 925 (West 1986); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1987) (if acquittee committed act, attempt, or threat of serious bodily injury to
another); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(1) (West 1985).
12. Arkansas's statute specifically provides for all three options. The trial court may commit
dangerous and mentally ill acquittees for thirty days, after which the director of the state
hospital may initiate civil commitment proceedings. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612(1)(a) (1977 &
Supp. 1985). There may also be a separate post-acquittal hearing for the introduction of
additional medical evidence. Id. § 41-612(2)(c). Texas and New York statutes distinguish between
those acquittees who are mentally ill and dangerous and those who are merely mentally ill. In
these states, dangerous acquittees remain under the jurisdiction of the criminal court for further
proceedings, while the nondangerous acquittees are subject to regular civil commitment. N.Y.
CRDIs. PROC. LAW § 330.20(6), (7) (McKinney 1983); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)
(Vernon Supp. 1987). In Michigan, as in Arkansas, the trial court's short commitment of the
LAWS ANN. §
acquittee is followed by regular civil commitment proceedings. MICH. Com?.
330.2050(l)-(3) (West 1980). The state of Washington distinguishes between those acquitted of
felonies and those acquitted of non-felonies. Felony acquittees may be committed by the trial
court, while non-felony acquittees undergo regular civil commitment proceedings. WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.77.110 (Supp. 1987). Mississippi's statute also provides for both civil commitment and trial court commitment. Mississippi distinguishes between the insane, who are
committed by the trial court, and the feeble minded, who are civilly committed. Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 99-13-7, 99-13-9 (1972). Among those states that explicitly allow commitment by either
the trial court, or on special hearing, or both, are Alaska, Hawaii, Oregon, Nebraska, Utah,
and Wyoming. See infra notes 13, 19-22 and accompanying text.
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The relationship among the various nonautomatic commitment options is
sometimes explicit in the statutes, but more often the relationship is a matter
of inference. In states where the criminal trial court is empowered to commit
the acquittee forthwith, the authority is typically discretionary, to be exercised
if the court or jury finds that the trial proceedings uncovered grounds
sufficient to support this disposition, such as continued mental illness and/
or dangerousness, and that the development of further evidence is unnec-

essary. At least two states permit this type of immediate commitment only
if the acquittee does not contest, 3 a proviso that may be implicit in the
other statutes as well. Given the somewhat perfunctory nature of the procedure, commitment under this statutory scheme should be limited to com-

paratively short periods, such as a maximum of thirty days,' 4 with longer
confinements preferably predicated on more elaborate and specifically fo-

cused inquiries.
Such pointed inquiries into the need to commit the acquittee are the
essence of the special hearing procedures, which is the increasingly favored

route whereby the states' criminal trial courts may render the dispositional
decision. In the ABA Standards, the special procedure is reserved for felons

who are both mentally ill and dangerous, while the fate of misdemeanants
and defendants "acquitted of felonies which did not involve acts causing,
threatening, or creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily harm"
can be decided only via regular civil commitment proceedings.' With an
isolated exception or two, 16 such distinctions are not duplicated in the state
statutes, which typically apply to all insanity acquittees, undifferentiated by
type of crime. 7 The conceptual heart of the special hearing statutes is that
more evidence on the acquittee's present committability needs to be developed

and considered, because the court itself, the prosecution, or the defendant
believes that the available information is insufficient for, or contradictory

13. HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-411 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.325(1) (1985).
14. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612(1)(a) (1977 & Supp. 1985). See supra note 12.
15. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.3(b).
16. See supra note 12. See, e.g., Washington (felony/misdemeanor distinction); Texas
(dangerousness of acquittee); New York (dangerousness of acquittee).
17. The following twenty-four statutes provide some sort of post-verdict hearing, and while
each state's hearing provisions may not apply to all acquittees, none of them explicitly differentiate between types of crime committed. ALA. CODE § 15-16-41 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-612(2)(c) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257c (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. §
27-1503(d), (e) (Harrison Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-411(2) (1985); ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985); IOWA
R. CRrM. P. 21(8)(b) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); MAss. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301 (1985); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-3701 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8 (West 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §
1161 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.325 (1985) (on request of either prosecutor or acquittee);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4 (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40 (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.2 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303 (Supp. 1986);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4820 (1974); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-181 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-3 (1986); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306 (1977).
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to, a decision to commit. This concept is expressed in a variety of ways: the
statutes may speak directly to the court's discretion to determine the desirability of hearing further evidence, s sometimes phrasing the issue in terms
of the court's having "probable cause" to believe that the acquittee needs
to be committed; 9 the statutes may frame the issue in terms of determining
who has the authority to move or to petition for the special evaluation and
hearing;20 or the statutes may focus on whether or not the acquittee contests
or denies any need for commitment. 2 Alaska's statute takes the unique
position that a special hearing is required if the acquittee, when raising the
insanity defense, simultaneously denies being dangerous due to mental ill22
ness.
The third dispositional alternative, committing insanity acquittees in a civil
proceeding, is in a final sense always available. The law does not say that
insanity acquittees or any other group of persons shall not be civilly committed. The historic quasi-criminal treatment of insanity acquittees via dispositional decisions made by the criminal court committing the acquittee to
institutions for the criminally insane suggests, however, that today's statutes
that specifically authorize civil commitment 23 of this population are a necessary redundancy. Nebraska's statute may be viewed as prototypical, if not
of today's law, then of its likely form in the years ahead. In that state, the
director of a state hospital may initiate civil commitment proceedings fol-24
lowing the initial ninety day commitment ordered by the criminal trial court.

18. Statutes giving criminal courts discretion as to whether further evidence regarding
commitment is necessary: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612(2) (1977); HAW. REv. STAT. § 704-411(2)
(1985); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985); Wvo. STAT. § 7-11-306(a) (1982
& Supp. 1985). Montana vests discretion in the trial court to move for a special hearing if
there was a bench trial but if trial was by jury, a special hearing is mandatory. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-301(1) (1953 & Supp. 1985).
19. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-16-41 (1975). See also NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3701(1) (1985);
infra note 24 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 1987) (prosecutor or mental
health official); Hawaii and Oregon, supra note 13 and Utah, infra note 21, allow the prosecutor
to so move.
21. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4(2) (1982 & Supp. 1986). Also, in Hawaii and Oregon, the
acquittee may move for a special hearing. See supra note 13.
22. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(c) (1984).
23. Statutes specifically authorizing civil commitment of insanity acquittees: ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-612(l)(a) (1977 & Supp. 1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(a) (1985);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.030(1)
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); MICH. Corn'. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050(3) (West 1980); MINN. R.
CRm. P. 20.02(8) (West Supp. 1987); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-13-9 (1972) (in cases of feeble
mindedness only); N.Y. CraM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(7) (McKinney 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-1321 (Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-04.1-21 (1985); Omo REV. CODE ANN. §
2945.40 (Anderson 1987); TEx. CraM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.110 (Supp. 1987) (if crime was not a felony); W. VA. CODE
§ 27-6A-3(b) (1986).
24. NEaB. REv. STAT. § 29-3701(1) (1985). The court may also extend the period by an
additional sixty days. Id. § 29-3701(6).
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In Indiana, regular civil commitment is an alternative to temporary commitment by the criminal court." Implicit in most statutes is the requirement
that the proceedings are to be conducted by a civil court, which may include
the probate court, a special mental health court, or as in Mississippi, the
chancery court. 26 As mentioned, some jurisdictions, as well as the ABA
Standards, make civil commitment available only to misdemeanants or nondangerous felony acquittees.21 Most states, however, do not restrict the reach
of the statutes along these lines. Two states in particular, Kentucky and
North Carolina, provide that civil commitment should be the only route by
which a court can commit insanity acquittees, 28 although the Kentucky statute
authorizes the criminal courts to order special short term detention (ten days)
29
in order to provide time to initiate the civil commitment proceedings. If
the acquittee is a proper candidate for civil commitment, he is presumably
to be confined in a civil hospital, although most laws are not explicit here.
The acquittee shares the rights accorded to all civil patients. The newer law
on the post-verdict treatment of insanity acquittees-the special standards,
rights and restrictions attendant to their commitment, institutional treatment,
and release-comes into play primarily for acquittees committed by the
criminal court. Because the trend is toward increasing numbers of these
special commitments, the remainder of this Article concentrates on the
provisions that comprise this new procedure.
B. Details of the Special Disposition Statutes
The new law on the commitment of insanity acquittees specifically addresses the following issues: (1) who initiates the commitment procedure; (2)
the nature of the psychological evaluation for determining what to do with
the acquittee; (3) the specific criteria for determining committability; (4) the
proof required and other evidentiary rules to be applied at the hearing; (5)
the need for legal representation; (6) the range of facilities appropriate for
placement of the acquittee and the principles to be used in choosing the
facility; (7) the duration of commitment; (8) periodic reviews of the acquittee's condition in order to determine the need for continued confinement;
(9) the authority to grant "leaves" from the institution of confinement; and
(10) notification requirements.
1. Responsibility for initiating the special procedures
Referred to in passing in the discussion of the concept underlying the
special commitment procedures, the issue of who moves or petitions for

25. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
26. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-13-9 (1972).
27. See supra notes 15 & 16.
28. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.030(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
15A-1321 (Supp. 1985).
29. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 504.030(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
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special commitment deserves some elaboration. In a majority of the states
that are explicit on the point, it is the criminal trial court that initiates the
special evaluation and hearing process.3 0 The reason presumably is that the
court, having presided as neutral arbiter over the trial that delved at length
into the defendant's mental condition (at the time of the crime, technically,
but with hard-to-resist implications for present mental state), is in the best
position to determine whether or not more and better evidence is needed for
the dispositional decision. Some statutes require, rather formalistically, that
the court have probable cause to initiate the special inquiry.3" Some states
also authorize the defense or the prosecution to petition for the special
evaluation and hearing,32 presuming that the assertion of adversarial perspectives will provide additional assurance that the use of the special process
will be made in appropriate cases. Massachusetts gives authority to apply
for a hearing not only to prosecutors, but also to officials of the department
of mental health, in deference to the propriety of medical judgment on this
issue."
2.

The nature of the evaluation procedure

One primary purpose of the special commitment statutes is to assure a
thorough evaluation of the acquittee's mental condition, in order that the
dispositional decision be a thoroughly informed one. Statutory provisions
that speak to the qualifications of the examiners and the time allowed for
completing the evaluation effect this purpose. With the exception of Montana, which designates the probation officer as the person to do the investigation into the acquittee's current mental condition,3 4 the states that have
provisions on this issue require an evaluation by mental health professionals.
The language of the California statute is just that general.35 Other statutes
are more specific, usually requiring at least one of the evaluators be a
psychiatrist or a clinical psychologist.3 6 Rhode Island designates the director
of the state department of mental health as the person to give an opinion
on the acquittee's mental condition.37 Utah's statute appears to require
examiners qualified in forensic mental health.3" In Indiana, the physicians

30. See supra note 18.
31. See supra note 19.
32. See supra notes 20 & 21.

33.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.

ch. 123, § 16(b) (West 1986).

34. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-112 (1985).
35. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(b) (West Supp. 1987) (community program director or a
designee).
36. Statutes requiring evaluation of an acquittee by a psychiatrist or psychologist: HAW.
REV. STAT. § 704-411(3) (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8(a) (West 1982); N.Y. CaMs. PROC.
LAW § 330.20(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); S.D.
CODEFED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.1 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(1) (Supp. 1986).
37. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(c)(1) (1984).
38. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4(1) (Supp. 1987).
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or psychologists who testified at the criminal trial, and any other persons
with knowledge of the commitment issues, must provide the testimony at
the hearing on the acquittee's present mental state.3 9 In Michigan, the trial
court commits insanity acquittees, for a period not to exceed sixty days, to
the state's special Center for Forensic Psychiatry, which conducts evaluations
of all criminal defendants about whom a question of mental condition arises.
Examinations of the acquittees, to determine their fitness for commitment
by civil commitment standards, are done by two physicians of this Center,
one of whom must be a psychiatrist. 40 The statutory time allowed for the
evaluation, where it is specified, is of significant length, suggesting a process
akin to observational hospitalization in civil cases. The range is generally
from 15 to 120 days. 41 States in the middle range, such as New York, which
allows thirty days, provide for a possibile time extension of another period
42
of identical length.
As exemplified by the ABA Standards, the progressive model requires the
evaluation be performed in accordance with the "least restrictive alternative"
principle, 43 meaning either on an inpatient or outpatient basis, as determined
by the condition of the acquittee and the availability of evaluation resources.
Not many state statutes have as yet picked up on this example, at least not
with the specificity of the ABA Standards." The statutory language of a
good number of states, however, that designate the state hospital or any
appropriate facility as the evaluation site, could conceivably be stretched to
permit outpatient examinations.
3.

Criteria for commitment

Commitment of insanity acquittees, as for any person of ordinary civil
status, is legally authorized only if certain specifically enumerated conditions
are proved at the commitment proceedings. The special acquittee commitment
criteria are not radically different from the civil standards, but there are a
few wrinkles that reflect special legislative concerns with this particular
population and the threat that they may pose to society's safety. To be a
proper subject for commitment in the majority of states, the insanity ac-

39. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-2-4 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985).
40. MIcH. Comn. LAws ANN. § 330.2050(1) (West 1980).
41. California and Iowa provide for fifteen day evaluation periods, with Iowa providing
for a fifteen day extension. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(b) (West Supp. 1987); IowA R. CRIM. P.
21(8)(b) (codified at IowA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)). South Carolina's statute
sets the state's maximum evaluation period at 120 days. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(A) (Law.
Co-op. 1985).
42. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(4) (McKinney 1983) (thirty day evaluation
period).
43. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.2(b).
44. California's and New York's are among the few. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(b) (West
Supp. 1987); N.Y. Cans. PROC. LAW § 330.20(3) (McKinney 1983).
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quittee must be both mentally impaired and dangerous.4 1 "Dangerous to self
or others," or some close paraphrase of this, is the most common formulation of the latter criterion. In Illinois, the statute defines dangerousness to
self as the inability to provide for basic needs so as to guard against physical
harm to oneself.4 6 A number of states premise commitment on the criterion
of danger to others only, perhaps because the danger to self standard is
deemed appropriate exclusively in civil cases. 47 At least five states, however,
explicitly base the commitment of insanity acquittees on the same criteria
that determine civil commitment.4 8 In a small number of states, such as
Ohio, proof of the acquittee's mental impairment alone, without reference
to dangerousness, is sufficient to authorize commitment. These states presume dangerousness from the criminal act for which the acquittee was tried,
even if not convicted. 49 The ABA Standards require the court to find, beyond
a reasonable doubt, that the acquittee committed the crime before commitment can be ordered. 0 So far, however, the states have not followed this
lead. Hawaii and Wyoming frame the issue negatively, providing that in
order to qualify for commitment, the acquittee must not be a proper subject
for supervised or unsupervised release. 1 The Oregon statute explicitly instructs the court to have the protection of society as its primary concern in
2
making the decision to commit or release.

45. Statutes requiring that an acquittee be both mentally ill and dangerous to self or others
ii order to commit: ALA. CODE § 15-16-43 (1975); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612(l)(a) (1977 &
Supp. 1985); CON. GEN. STAT. ANN.-§ 17-177(a) (West Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-2-4(a) (1985); IOWA R. Carm. P. 21(8)(b) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2
(West Supp. 1987)); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3702 (1985); N.Y. Canm. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(6)
(McKinney 1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.327(1),
161.328(1) (1985); S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.3 (Supp. 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 33-7-303, 33-6-104 (Supp. 1986); Tax. CRnm. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4) (Vernon Supp.
1987) (dangerous to self and others as defined in Article 5547-51 of Texas Civil Statutes); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(2) (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(1) (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT.
§ 7-11-306(d) (1977).
46. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(a)(1)(A)(ii) (1985).
47. Statutes premising commitment of acquittees on dangerousness to others only: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 46-612(l)(a) (1977 & Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-301(2) (1985); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:9-a (1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 16.327(1), 16.328(1) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS AN. § 23A-26-12.4 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.110 (Supp. 1987).
Oklahoma frames its statute in terms of danger to the public peace or safety. OaLA. STAT.

tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986).
48. Statutes with the same requirements for commitment of acquittees as for civil commitment: GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(e) (Harrison Supp. 1986); MASs. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123,
§ 16(b) (West 1987); MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050(2) (West 1980); NEB. REv. STAT. §
29-3702 (1985); TEx. CRMs. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(a), (d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1987); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(a) (Supp. 1986).
49. Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(C) (Anderson 1987). California is another. CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1026(a), (b)(West 1970 & Supp. 1986). See also Harris v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225 (4th
Cir. 1982) (Virginia law permits commitment based on insanity or dangerousness).
50. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.4(c).
51. HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-411(l)(a) (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306(d) (1977).
ANN.

52. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.327(5) (1985).
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Proving the case

Some of the special commitment statutes for acquittees include special
provisions on the issue of proof, such as what the specific standard is, which
party has the burden, and whether in presenting the case the evidentiary
rules of ordinary trials apply.
The preponderance of evidence standard, used to resolve issues in civil
trials, prevails in most of the states where the legislature has addressed the
question of what burden the state must meet in order to commit the
acquittee1 3 This is appropriate enough to the extent that the acquittee's
commitment is viewed as a civil issue. The elusiveness of determinations
involving the mental health of persons, be it their need for treatment, present
or future dangerousness, likelihood of recovery, and so forth, also supports
a standard of proof that is not too onerous. For these same reasons, the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard of criminal proceedings would appear
to be inappropriate. Four states take an intermediate position, providing for
a clear and convincing standard of proof that falls somewhere between the
traditional civil and criminal burdens. 4 Following the United States Supreme
Court's lead in Addington v. Texas,55 a civil commitment case, and the
position espoused in the ABA provisions, 56 this standard may be the model
for future insanity acquittee statutes.
Few state statutes specify which party has the burden of persuasion in
commitment proceedings. The norm in civil commitment cases is that the
state has this burden. The acquittee statutes of four jurisdictions, as well as
the ABA Standards, specifically endorse this position,5 7 and the logic of the
law would seem to be that this also is true where it is not explicitly stated.
Where the lawmakers feel that the legal or factual situation is sufficiently
different to shift the burden of persuasion to the acquittee to prove to the
court that he should not be committed, the legislature must expressly enact
provisions authorizing this departure from the norm. This position has been

53. Statutes requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence for commitment or release:

ARK.
HAW.

STAT. ANN.

REv.

STAT.

§ 41-612(3) (1977);

§ 17-257c(f) (West Supp. 1987);
tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); OR. REV.

CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.

§ 704-411(4) (1985); OKLA.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 161.327(1), 161.328(1) (1985). South Dakota requires a preponderance of the evidence
standard when the offense did not involve bodily injury or damage to another's property, or
the substantial risk thereof. S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.3 (Supp. 1987).
54. Statutes requiring clear and convincing evidence for commitment of an acquittee: ALASKA
STAT. § 12.47.090(c) (1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3702 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(2)
(Supp. 1987). South Dakota requires the clear and convincing standard in cases involving
offenses resulting in bodily injury or damage to another's property, or the substantial risk
STAT.

thereof. S.D.

CODIFIED LAWS ANN.

§ 23A-26-12.3 (Supp. 1987).

55. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
56. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.4.
57. Statutes specifying that the state has the burden of persuasion in commitment proceedings: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612(3) (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-411(4) (1985); N.Y. Can.
PROC. LAW § 330.20(6) (McKinney 1983); OIKA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986).
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adopted by at least three states.58 Given that automatic commitment without
a special hearing is still authorized by statute in some jurisdictions and has
recently been upheld by the United States Supreme Court, 59 there would
appear to be no constitutional obstacle to the middle-ground position of
holding a hearing, but placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant
acquittee.
The right to confront adverse witnesses is one of the essential aspects of
a fair hearing. Some characteristics of commitment hearings, however, argue
for making exceptions to this right: (1) the relevant medical evidence may
be hard to obtain directly because much of it is contained in written patient
records, and doctors and other mental health personnel, particularly those
working in populous institutions, cannot be burdened with giving direct
testimony on each point in every case; (2) commitment proceedings are
ostensibly in the best interest of the proposed patient-they are not adversarial and there are no adverse witnesses. These arguments have been accepted
by the courts in a number of jurisdictions and case law has carved out
exceptions to the rules of evidence for the purpose of commitment hearings.
The position favoring these exceptions is less secure, however, than it was
a decade or two ago. Emphasizing the potential for serious deprivations of
liberty, the recent trend is toward reasserting procedural protections for
persons involved in commitment proceedings. 60 The quasi-criminal nature of
committing insanity acquittees may provide particular justification for reas61
serting procedural safeguards. In line with this reasoning, the ABA Standards
expressly provide that the ordinary rules of evidence apply in insanity
acquittee hearings. Only two states, New Mexico and Washington, duplicate
this position, but others may follow. 62 In states with no statutory provisions
on the subject, any exceptions to the rules of evidence in civil commitment
proceedings presumably apply with equal force to dispositional hearings for
insanity acquittees.
5. Legal representation
That a proposed patient has a right to legal representation in civil commitment proceedings is today beyond question. If anything, this right is even
more compelling in quasi-criminal proceedings to determine the disposition
of insanity acquittees. The operative issues today are whether or not such

58. Statutes specifying that the acquittee has the burden of persuasion: ALASICA STAT. §
12.47.090(c) (1984); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257c(f) (West Supp. 1987); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAws ANN. § 23A-26-12.3 (Supp.
1987).
59. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
60. For a discussion of the trend and citation to the cases, see J. BRAMEL, J. PARRY & B.
WEINER, supra note 2, at 67-68.
61. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.5(d).
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-1(B)(1) (1984) (for use of depositions of state personnel);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.100 (1980) (for use of expert witnesses).
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representation is mandatory, and whether or not the state is required to
provide counsel in cases where the person cannot pay for it. The vast majority
of jurisdictions have statutes mandating representation for civil cases and,
logically, such a requirement is even more appropriate for insanity acquittees.
It comes as no surprise that the ABA Standards and the special acquittee
statutes in eight states explicitly provide for mandatory appointment of
counsel. 63 Even in states without specific provisions to this effect, the argument that a similar mandate exists as a logical extension of the civil
commitment requirement appears virtually unimpeachable.
Several of the more interesting questions on the issue of legal representation
remain largely untouched in both the special acquittee statutes and the regular
civil commitment provisions, namely: (1) who should provide the representation; (2) what the compensation level should be; (3) when the appointment
should be made; and (4) what the role of legal counsel should be in this
setting. Legislative resolution of the first three issues would be helpful. .The
question of the lawyer's role, however, is perhaps better left to evolving
professional norms and customs.
6. Place of treatment
Provisions designating where the insanity acquittee is to be treated are an
important feature of the special statutory schemes covering this population.
In the large majority of states, the state facilities are singled out as the
appropriate place for treatment.6 A number of states specify that it must
be a secure facility. 65 The preoccupation with security for the sake of public

63. Mandatory appointment of counsel is prescribed by: ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, §
7-7.5(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(e)(2) (Harrison Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-2-4(c) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3704 (1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-4 (1984); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.327(7) (1985) (on appeal); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-46-3 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-182(a) (1983).
64. The state facility is designated as the place of treatment of the acquittee as provided
by: COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-105(4) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-182 (West Supp.
1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(a) (1979); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(a) (1981); IOWA R.
CRim. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3428(1) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 654 (West Supp. 1987); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 99-13-7 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552-040(2) (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-14-301(2) (1985) (superintendent of state hospital places acquittee in an appropriate
institution); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3702 (1985) (regional center or other facility); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:4-8(b)(3) (West 1982); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1321 (Supp. 1985); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.327(2)(a) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
40.1-5.3-4(e) (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-2440(c)(2)(b) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12 (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(2) (Supp. 1987); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.110 (Supp. 1987); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-306(d) (1977).
65. Statutes requiring placement of the acquittee in a secure facility: ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3994(A) (Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(a) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-3428(1) (Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.425(1) (1985); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 651:9-a (1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 330.20(1)(O, 330.20(6) (McKinney 1983)
(permits nonsecure facility under certain conditions).
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safety is a traditional feature of the law. The modern trend reflected in these
statutes is toward more selectivity, as in the Illinois statute for example, that
requires confinement in a secure setting unless the court determines that
there is compelling evidence that such placement is not necessary. 66 In such
cases, the possible alternatives include outpatient treatment, treatment in a
community adjustment facility, or participation in a special drug, alcohol,
or family therapy program. 67 Six states, in addition to Illinois, explicitly
provide for the outpatient treatment option in appropriate cases .68
Placement decisions made in accordance with the principle of the least
restrictive treatment alternative, a major development in the civil commitment
law, are mandated in the insanity acquittee statutes of four states. 69 In New
Jersey, the principle is articulated in terms of transferring appropriate cases
to a less restrictive setting, as distinct from its application in the initial
placement decision. 70 Presumably, the application of this principle could lead
to outpatient treatment even where the statutes do not specifically allude to
this option. The ABA Standards emphasize treatment under conditions
comparable to those afforded persons whose fate is decided under general
civil commitment statutes, 71 a requirement that, given the shape of today's
civil commitment laws, would in most states encompass outpatient and other
treatment options that are least restrictive of liberty and take into account
the acquittee's condition and needs. Finally, the insanity acquittee provisions
of a few states exhibit unique features that are not found in the statutes of
most states. The Texas law, for example, permits the court to place the
acquittee in the care of a responsible private person pending disposition by
the regular civil process.7 2 Delaware explicitly provides for the possibility of
special treatment activities, including off-grounds employment, for insanity
acquittees. 73 New Jersey law prohibits confinement of insanity acquittees in
penal facilities. 74 At least three states, Arkansas, California, and Hawaii,
explicitly provide for the possibility of-out-of-state placement of insanity
acquittees, on the theory, one supposes, that other states may have better,

66. ILL. REv. STAT. CH. 38, PARA. 1005-2-4(A) (1985).
67. Id.
68. Statutes explicitly allowing outpatient treatment of acquittees: FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.217(b)
(West Supp. 1987); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.425(3) (1985) (if acquittee is not
dangerous); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.327(2)(b) (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(b)(3) (Supp.
1986); TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
69. Statutes mandating treatment in the least restrictive setting: HAW. RaV. STAT. § 704411(1)(a) (1985) (for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3701(4)
(1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West 1982); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.110 (Supp.

1987).
70. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West 1982).
71. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.6.
72. TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(a) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (if crime did not
involve serious injury).
73. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(c)(1) (Supp. 1986).
74. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8(c) (West 1982).
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more specialized treatment programs for this special population. 75
7. Duration of commitment/treatment
Traditionally, both the law and practice have been that a person acquitted
by reason of insanity is committed for an indeterminate period. In cases
that involved serious crimes, or in cases where the acquittee's mental condition was not responsive to available treatment, indeterminate commitment
often meant commitment for life. At least eleven legislatures applying the
constitutional principle of equal protection under the laws, however, have
been moved in recent years to enact provisions that limit the duration of
the acquittee's confinement to no more than the maximum prison sentence76
the defendant could have received if convicted on the underlying charge.
If, at the expiration of this period, the acquittee still needs to be confined
or treated, the statutes generally provide for civil commitment proceedings
to effect continued confinement. In a few states, there are special commitment extension procedures, such as in California, where the court may order
an additional two years of confinement after a hearing initiated by the
prosecutor's petition. 77 In Arkansas, an automatic recommitment hearing is
7
required at the expiration of the acquittee's maximum confinement term. 1
The practical option of mandating outpatient treatment and monitoring after
confinement is made explicit in statutes such as the one in Illinois which
authorizes the court to grant a conditional 79release, the terms of which may
remain in force for a period of five years.
In six states, the traditional disposition of indeterminate commitment for
insanity acquittees, recently upheld by the United States Supreme Court in
Jones v. United States,80 remains on the books, at least technically. 8 By

75, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-616 (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(b) (West Supp. 1987);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-417 (1985).
76. Statutes limiting confinement of acquittees to a duration no longer than the maximum
sentence if convicted: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(d) (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612.1 (Supp.
1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(a)(1) (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17257c(e)(l) (West Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(b) (1985); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 175.521(2), 178.460(4) (1985) (up to maximum of ten years, subject to recommitment in a
civil proceeding); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-8(b)(3) (West 1982); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.327(1),
161.328(3), 161.341(1) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1987) (subject to recommitment in a civil
proceeding); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(4) (West 1985).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.5(b)(6) (West Supp. 1987).
78. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-612.1 (Supp. 1985).
79. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(a)(1)(D) (1985) (an additional three years in
forcible felony cases).
80. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
81. Statutes imposing commitment of acquittees for an indefinite period: DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 403(b) (Supp. 1986) (until public safety not endangered); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.34(e) (1984) (until acquittee no longer meets commitment criteria); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-145(2) (Supp. 1987) (until acquittee recovers); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(a) (Supp. 1986)
(indeterminate period).
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law, the commitment continues until the acquittee has recovered. However,
modern judicial review procedures in those states, varying from mandatory
reassessment of the patient's condition every six months to once every five
years, have significantly altered the practical meaning of the indeterminate
term. 2 Periodic mandatory review guards against the acquittee's becoming
lost in the institution's back wards and greatly decreases the likelihood of
lifetime confinement. Administrative review requirements complement the
judicial safeguards that the law has erected around the acquittee.
8. Administrative review procedures
In virtually all of the states, the state mental health agency or the particular
institution where the acquittee is confined is responsible for implementing
the administrative review safeguards.8 3 Often, the directors of these entities
are designated as the responsible party.14 Oregon and Connecticut are among
the few states that have special review bodies that appoint independent
mental health professionals to monitor and review the acquittee's condition. 5
The state of Washington designates a wide range of potential reviewers, such
as qualified professionals, experts retained by the acquittee, the physician in
charge of the acquittee's case, or the probation officer, in cases where the
acquittee has been conditionally released. 6
Administrative review generally must be conducted more often than judicial
review, once every six months being the average frequency required. 7 In

82. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(f) (1984) (every six months); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
651:11-a (1986) (five years).
83. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(h) (1984); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(e) (West Supp.
1987); FLA. R. CAM. P. 3.218 (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.15 (West Supp.
1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(b) (1985); IowA R. CRIM. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(1) (Supp.
1986); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.450(1) (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161
(West 1986); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 23A-46-4(2) (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2181(3) (Supp. 1986).
84. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(e) (West Supp. 1987); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 21(8)(e)
(codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); S.D. CODIIED LAWS ANN. § 23A46-4 (Supp. 1987). In Connecticut, the Superintendent reports to the Psychiatric Security Review
Board which in turn reports to the court. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257g (West Supp.
1987). See also infra note 85.
85. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257b (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.346(2)
(1985). Cf. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.455(2) (1985) (establishing a court appointed
sanity commission to work with the mental health agency).
86. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.77.140, 10.77.160 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
87. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(e) (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
17-257g (West Supp. 1987) (for hospital superintendent's report); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-2-4(b) (1985) (every sixty days); IOWA R. CRim. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)) (every sixty days); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 178.450(2), 175.521(2) (1985);
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-6-108(d) (if hospitalized), 32-7-303(b)(4) (if outpatient treatment is
ordered) (1984 & Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (1983 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.77.140 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
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Illinois and Iowa, the first review must take place thirty days after the
acquittee's commitment and every sixty days thereafter.88 Oregon's special
system, providing for supervision by its Psychiatric Security Review Board
(PSRB), guarantees the most frequent reviews. "Any time" after the acquittee is committed, the hospital superintendent may apply for the acquittee's release, if warranted, triggering a full hearing before the Board. The
Board also conducts a hearing on any other application for the acquittee's
release. The Board may appoint a psychiatrist or licensed psychologist on
its own initiative to review the acquittee's condition at any time. The
condition of an acquittee on conditional release must be reviewed and
reported to the Board monthly and the Board must hold a full hearing for
any acquittee who has been under its jurisdiction for five years, whether
confined or on conditional release, in order to determine whether full release
from its jurisdiction is appropriate. 89
Except in Oregon, where the PSRB has final decision making authority,
and in Connecticut, which in 1985 adopted a modified version of the Oregon
review board model, 90 findings produced by the administrative review process
in all states must be reported to the court. 91 The court then, on its own
motion, must decide what, if any, action to take. A number of states also
require that the findings be presented to the prosecutor. 92 Other states require
that, in addition, the findings be presented to the defendant's attorney. 93 In
these states, the adversaries in the case thus have the power to act on the
basis of the review, supplementing the more neutral interest of the court in
the matter. Finally, in two or three states where the central mental health
agency itself does not conduct the review, that agency must receive the
results. 94

88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(b) (1985); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 21(8)(e) (codified
at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)).
89. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.341(2), 161.346(1), 161.346(2), 161.327(2)(b), 161.351(3) (1985).
90. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257g (West Supp. 1987). By this provision, the results of
the administrative review are reported to the PSRB. The PSRB in turn furnishes copies to the
state's attorney and counsel for the acquittee.
91. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 12.47.090(h) (1984); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(e) (West Supp.
1987); FLA. R. Cium. P. 3.218 (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.15 (West Supp.
1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(b) (1985); IowA R. CRIM. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(l) (Supp.
1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.450(2) (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-46-4(2) (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Supp.
1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.140 (1980).
92. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(e) (West Supp. 1987); IOWA R. CRr.. P. 21(8)(e)
(codified at IowA CODE AN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161
(West 1986); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-7-303(b)(4) (Supp. 1986) (of acquittee's continuing need
for outpatient treatment); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.160 (1980).
93. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(e) (West Supp. 1987); IOWA R. CRim. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at
IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986).
94. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(e) (West Supp. 1987) (County Mental Health Director); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN.

§ 10.77.140 (1980).
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Institutional leaves

Granting institutional leaves for mental patients has traditionally been an
administrative decision. The decision is based, at least in theory, on a medical
assessment of the individual's condition and the health benefits that flow
from the leave. Typically, state statutes designate the hospital superintendent

as the official responsible for the decision to authorize the leave. The essence
of this scheme has been retained in the insanity acquitee statutes. 95 Delaware
and Maine are unique in that they empower the acquittee to petition for a
leave. In Delaware, the acquittee's power supplements the hospital superintendent's authority to move for the patient's leave. 96 In Maine, the initiative
apparently resides in the acquittee exclusively, although the hospital retains
some responsibility because the statute requires that the recommendation of
the facility's psychiatrists accompany the petition. 9

The primary distinction between the special acquittee statutes and the civil
commitment procedures is that with the special acquittee statutes the decision
regarding patient leaves is not solely an administrative prerogative, but

requires court approval. Such judicial endorsement is mandatory in all states
that have laws on this subject, 98 with the exception of Connecticut and
Oregon, whose centralized review bodies are the ultimate and independent

decision making authority. 99 In Kansas, a judicial hearing on the issue is
required if the prosecution requests it. '0 The underlying rationale for requiring judicial approval is the presumption that the acquittee population
poses special risks to the public safety that are not adequately met by leaving
decisions regarding this population's eventual release to medical judgment

alone.
Provisions that specify the length and frequency of the leaves vary widely.
New York's law contemplates authorized institutional absences of no more
than fourteen days. 101 The Delaware statute provides for six months,10 2 and
Michigan's statute allows five year extensions.103 In Illinois, the court must

95. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-118 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257h (West
Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(c)(1) (Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-2-4(b) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2) (Supp. 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
135:28-a (1977). In Nebraska, the court initially specifies the conditions of the acquittee's
confinement, "including whether or not the facility may grant the person leave into the
community." NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3702 (1979 & Supp. 1984).
96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(c)(1) (Supp. 1986).
97. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(2) (Supp. 1986).
98. See, e.g., CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-118(1)(a) (1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(b)
(Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(b) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3)
(Supp. 1986) (upon prosecutor's request); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(2) (Supp.
1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3702 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:28-a (1977).
99. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257h (West Supp. 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.400 (1985).
100. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (Supp. 1986).
101. N.Y. CRiw. PROC. LAw 330.20(1)(k) (McKinney 1983).
102. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(c)(6) (Supp. 1986) (with the possibility of court extension).
103. MICH. Comrn. LAWs ANN. § 330.2050(5) (West 1980).
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re-evaluate the desirability of the acquittee's leave every sixty days in order
for the leave to continue. °4 Other states authorize leaves "whenever it would
advance treatment" or for any period deemed appropriate by the acquittee's
medical supervisors. 0°
10.

Notification requirements

Notification requirements are among the central features of the special
acquittee disposition statutes. Such laws almost invariably have provisions
for notification. Public safety is the underlying rationale for these provisions.
The perceived danger posed by this special population mandates wide disclosure of the acquittee's situation or any changes in it. The requirements
are diverse, varying significantly from state to state in terms of what changes
in status require notification and to whom notice should be given.
Motivated by concern for public safety, most statutes require that the
°6
prosecutor's office be given notice of changes that affect the acquittee.'
This is because the prosecutor's office has the authority to take any required
remedial action. A few states require notifying the Attorney General, which
presumably achieves on a more centralized level the same purpose that
notifying the local prosecutor does. m° Several states also require notifying
the victim, presumably the specific target of any danger posed by the
acquittee. 0° Victim notification is part of a more general trend to involve,
notify, and compensate crime victims in the process of doing criminal justice.
Other states require notifying the committing court,' °9 the county sheriff," 0
or as Michigan does, a unique evaluation and disposition body such as the
Center for Forensic Psychiatry.'
The events that trigger notification also run the gamut. The more specific
and comprehensive statutes require disclosure of the acquittee's whereabouts,
transfers, authorized temporary leaves of more than twenty-four hours,

104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(b) (1985).
105. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257h (West Supp. 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-3428(2) (Supp. 1986). In Nebraska, such leaves must be consistent with public safety. NEB.
REv. STAT. § 29-3702 (1985).
106. Notice to the prosecutor is required by: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026(d) (West Supp. 1987)
(prior to being transferred between state hospitals); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(d) (Harrison
Supp. 1986) (of report of mental condition); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(6) (Supp.
1986) (of any hearing); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3701(5), (6) (1985) (of evaluation findings); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 135:28-a (1977) (of request for off-ground privileges); N.Y. CRM. PRoC.
LAW § 330.20(5), (8), (9), (10) (McKinney Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(B) (Law.

Co-op. 1985) (of initial findings of special hearing); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4821 (1974) (time
and place of hearing); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-3(c) (1986) (of any hearing within five years).
107. See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(c)(1), (d), (e) (1984).
108. Notice to the victim is required by: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257v (West Supp.
1987) (of hearings, orders, or escape); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.325, 161.326 (1985).
109. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(d) (Harrison Supp. 1986) (of report of mental condition).
110. IOWA R. Clim. P. 21(8)(d) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)).
111. MICH. Comp. LAWS. ANN. § 330.2050(4) (West 1980).
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unauthorized absences," 2 the results of psychiatric evaluations, applications
for furlough, and the state's petition for the acquittee's retention." 3 Other
states more generally mandate disclosure of any formal review of the acquittee's status, placement, or condition." 4 The purpose behind disclosure is
to enable the various interested parties to prepare for any change in the

acquittee's situation. Some consider these provisions inappropriately punitive
for a population not convicted under any criminal charge. Others hail the
procedure as a proper acknowledgement of the "human realities."
C. Post-Commitment Release Provisions-General Characteristics
The release provisions of the special insanity acquittee statutes are unique

in several important respects. First, the judiciary dominates the process.
Whereas a dwindling number of states (about half) have judicial discharge
procedures following civil commitment, with administrative discharge increasingly favored," 5 the precise opposite is true of the insanity acquittee
statutes. In the latter, judicial discharge is the primary route" 6 and the
administrative discharge option, if it is available at all, is a secondary

112. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-112(b)(1) (Supp. 1986).
113. N.Y. Carm. PROC. LAW §§ 330.120(5) (psychiatric evaluation), 330.20(8), (9) (retention
petitions), 330.20(10) (furlough application) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
114. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257v (West Supp. 1987) (victim notified of hearings or
acquittee's escape); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(d) (Harrison Supp. 1986) (prosecutor, acquittee's
attorney, and trial judge notified of report of acquittee's mental condition); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 29-3701(5) (1985) (prosecutor notified of evaluation findings); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
135:28-a (1977) (prosecutor notified of request for off-ground privileges); N.Y. CRIM. PROC.
LAW § 330.20(5) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (prosecutor, defendant's counsel, and Mental Hygiene
Legal Service notified of psychiatric evaluation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(c)(1) (1984)
(Attorney General and victim); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(B) (Law. Co-op. 1985) (prosecutor,
acquittee, and trial court notified of initial findings).
115. See J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 208-13.
116. Discharge of the acquittee is permitted only by judicial order as provided by: ALASKA
STAT. § 12.47.090(g) (1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(5) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e)
(West Supp. 1987); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-115(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257n
(West Supp. 1987) (for final discharge); FLA. R. CRms. P. 3.219(c) (West Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 916.17(3) (West 1985); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(e), (f) (Harrison Supp. 1986);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-415 (1985); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(h) (1985); IOWA R.
CRam. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); LA. CODE CaMs.
PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(1), (2), (3)
(Supp. 1986); MD. HEAITH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-116(b) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §
46-14-302(3), (4) (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3703 (1985); NEV. Rav. STAT. §§ 175.521(2),
178.460 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(b) (West 1982); N.Y. Cim. PROC. LAW § 330.20(8),
(9), (12) (McKinney Supp. 1987); OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40 (Anderson 1987); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(h) (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(C)(2)(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.5 (Supp. 1987); TEx. Cian. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(5)
(Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §
4 822(c) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.77.200(1) (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-306(g)
(1977).
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procedure employed only if there is no contest on the issue. 1 7 Only three
states deviate from this pattern. In Connecticut and Oregon, discharge
decisions are made by the PSRB, although in Connecticut the Board's
decision is final only as to conditional releases, with full discharge requiring
judicial approval of the Board's recommendation." 8 In Michigan, the state's
civil commitment laws govern the release of insanity acquittees, except that
a special Forensic Center must evaluate the acquittee and approve decisions
to discharge."19
Another critical feature of the release provisions for insanity acquittees is
the emphasis on the conditional discharge option, as distinct from regular,
absolute discharge. Conditional discharge may include supervision, outpatient
treatment, modification, and revocation provisions. The length and detail of
these provisions is itself a major characteristic of the laws on the release of
insanity acquittees.
D. Details of the Special Release Statutes
The law on the release of insanity acquittees in many important respects
mirrors its counterpart on initial disposition. Among the areas addressed
here are: (1) who initiates the release procedure; (2) when it can be invoked;
(3) the nature of the hearing process; (4) the specific criteria for determining
whether the acquittee is fit for release; (5) who may present evidence and
what type; (6) the burden and standard of proof at the release hearing; (7)
requirements for legal representation; (8) the type of release available, i.e.,
unconditional or conditional; and in the latter case (9) types of conditions;
(10) procedures for modifying the conditions; (11) procedures to revoke the
release; (12) time limits; (13) the outpatient treatment option; and (14)
notification requirements. In addition to these special procedures, habeas
corpus is available to insanity acquittees, as it is for all involuntarily confined
persons. 20 The only issue is whether there is specific reference to the availability of the writ in the special acquittee statutes. There is such reference
in five jurisdictions: D.C., Illinois, South Dakota, Virginia, and Washington,

117. Administrative discharge is sometimes permitted as provided by: D.C. CODE ANN. § 24301(e) (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (Supp. 1986) (after thirty days notice to prosecutor,
sheriff, and court); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(e) (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
552.040(5) (Vernon 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986); W. VA. CODE § 276A-4 (1986).
118. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257a (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.346 (1985).
119. MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050(5) (West 1980).
120. The availability of the writ to insanity acquittees is not to be confused with the limits
to which it may be used. For example, the Nebraska Supreme Court recently ruled that the
state's commitment statute, as applied to persons acquitted by reason of insanity, was not
subject to collateral attack by means of the habeas corpus procedure. Mayfield v. Hartmann,
221 Neb. 122, 375 N.W.2d 146 (1985).
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as well as in the ABA Standards. 121 Further discussion of the habeas corpus
option will not appear here.
1.

Who initiates the release procedure

In the vast majority of states, the acquittee 22 or a representative of the
treatment provider 123 can initiate the release. The provider is usually represented by the director of the facility where the acquittee is confined, or
24
occasionally by someone from the central department of mental health.

121. Statutes specifically making habeas corpus available to acquittees: ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 9, § 7-7.8(d); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-301(g), 24-301(k)(7) (1981); ILL. REv. STAT.
ch. 38, para. 1005-2-40) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-46-6 (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE
ANN. § 19.2-181(5) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.200(3) (Supp. 1987).
122. Statutes in which the acquittee may initiate release: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(e) (1984);
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(B) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(2) (1977); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1026.2(a) (West Supp. 1987); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-115(1) (1986); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257i(b) (West Supp. 1987) (to Psychiatric Security Review Board); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(b) (Supp. 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(k)(1) (1981); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-1503(f)(1) (Harrison Supp. 1986); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-412(2) (1985); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(e) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428a(l) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE
CIMn. PROC. ANN. art. 655(B) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(2),
(3) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-118(a)(1) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 552-040(4) (Vernon 1953 & Supp. 1985); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-303 (1985); NEB. REv.
STAT. § 29-3703(1) (1985); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.460 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2C:4-9(c) (West 1982); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.341(4) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(g)
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(b) (Supp.
1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(4) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 10.77.150(1),
10.77.200(1) (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985); WYo. STAT. § 7-11-306(0
(1977).
123. Statutes in which the treatment provider may initiate release: Asuz. RaV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3994(B) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(1) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(a)
(West Supp. 1987); CoLo. Rav. STAT. §§ 16-8-115(1), 16-8-116 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-257i(a) (West Supp. 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(b) (Supp. 1986); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981); FLA. R. CRnm. P. 3.218(a) (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 271503(f)(1) (Harrison Supp. 1986); HAW. Rav. STAT. § 704-412(1) (1985); ILL. RaV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1005-2-4(d) (1985); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2
(West Supp. 1987)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2), (3) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIn. PROC.
ANN. art. 655(A) (West 1981); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(1)(2) (Supp. 1986); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-119(a)(1) (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(e)
(West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552-040(4) (Vernon 1987); MoNr. CODE ANN. § 46-14-302(1)
(1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:28 (1977) (superintendent may discharge acquittee unless
court or prosecutor requests a hearing); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 330.20(12), (13) (McKinney Supp. 1987); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(D)(4)
(Anderson 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.341(2) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(f) (1984);
S.D. CODIFUD LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.5 (Supp. 1987); TEx. CRtM. PROC. CODE ANN. §
46.03(4)(d)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(e) (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13, § 3822(c) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2) (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE
§ 27-64-4 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306(3) (1977).
124. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(12), (13) (McKinney Supp. 1987) (Commissioner of
Mental Health).

DEPA UL LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 37:181

In three states, the court may initiate the process. 25 Four states specifically
allow any interested party to file on behalf of the acquittee, and Maine
explicitly includes the spouse or next of kin. 26 In Colorado and Nebraska,
the prosecutor also may apply for the acquittee's release. This unique
role, at least in
authority clashes with the assumption that the prosecution's
27
the traditional adversary setting, is to oppose the release.
2.

Time parametersfor use of the release procedure

To prevent flooding the courts with repetitive applications for release,
most statutes prescribe waiting periods for both the first and subsequent
applications for release. Generally, there is a relatively brief wait (thirty days
to a year) after the initial disposition for the first filing, and longer waits
(an average of about one year) for any subsequent applications for release.'28
The ABA Standards and at least two states add the proviso that the period
may be shortened by a special court order. 29 Five states permit filing for
30
release at "any time."'1

125. The court may initiate release as provided by: COLO. REV. STAT. § 16.8-115(1) (1986);
§ 12-116(a)(1) (Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3703(1)
(1985).
126. An interested party may initiate release on behalf of the acquittee as provided by: DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(b) (Supp. 1986); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(e) (1985);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(3) (Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.341(4) (1985).
127. The prosecutor may initiate release as provided by: COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-115(1)
(1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3703(1) (1985).
128. Waiting periods for applications for release are provided by: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(e)
(1984) (one year for both first and subsequent applications); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 133994(B), (D) (Supp. 1986) (fifty days for first application, six months for subsequent release
hearings with acquittees whose crimes involve serious physical injury having to wait 230 days
for their first application); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(2) (1977) (ninety days, one year); CAL.
PENAL CODE §§ 1026.2(d), 1026.2(j) (West Supp. 1987) (180 days and one year until Jan. 1
1989; ninety days and one year thereafter); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-115(1) (1986) (180 days,
one year); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257n(a) (West Supp. 1987) (six months for both);
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-301(d)(2)(A), 24-301(k)(5) (1981) (fifty days, six months); GA. CODE
ANN. § 27-1503(f)(3) (Harrison Supp. 1986) (one year for subsequent applications); HAW. REV.
STAT. § 704-412(2) (1985) (ninety days, one year); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(e)
(1985) (sixty days for subsequent applications); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428a(1) (Supp. 1986)
(one year for both); LA. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 655(B) (West Supp. 1987) (six months,
one year); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(3) (Supp. 1986) (six months for subsequent
applications); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-118(a)(l) (Supp. 1986) (one year for both
unless application supported by physician's affidavit); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(7) (Vernon
1987) (180 days for subsequent application); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-303 (six months, one
year); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.450(2) (1985) (six months for subsequent applications);
OR. REV. STAT. § 161.341(5), (7) (1985) (six months for subsequent applications with mandatory
hearings at least every two years); TEx. C im. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(5) (ninety days
for subsequent applications) (Vernon Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987)
(six months, one year); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(4) (Supp. 1986) (six months, one year);
Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-306(f) (1977) (ninety days, six months).
129. The waiting period for release may be shortened by court order as provided by: ABA
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
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Three of the states that permit unlimited applications for release specify,
however, that this right is available only to persons other than the acquittee,
such as the hospital director. 3 ' Thus, Utah provides that the director may
apply anytime, while the acquittee is required to wait six months after the
initial disposition and one year for every filing thereafter.' 3 2 In view of the
fact that the medical determination of the acquittee's readiness for release
could indeed come anytime, while the acquittee likely has a perpetual desire
to be out of the institution, such differentiation in the law seems sensible.
Maryland's law has a special variation on the same theme in that the acquittee
is required to wait one year between the first and successive filings for
release, unless the application is supported by a physician's affidavit that
the acquittee is ready to go free.' 33 Rhode Island specifies that either the
34
acquitte or the hospital director may apply for release at anytime.
3.

Type of hearing

As mentioned, judicial domination of the release process is a central
feature of the special insanity acquittee statutes. Only Oregon and Connecticut depart from the discharge model where the court has the central role. 35
In those states, special psychiatric review boards make most of the critical
decisions regarding acquittees. Michigan's law, requiring central administrative endorsement of any discharge decision made at the release hearing,
presents a special twist.136
The traditional theory, if not always the practice of judicial decision
making, is that the decision making process occurs in the context of a formal
hearing complete with various set procedures for taking and weighing the
evidence. This is indeed the operative concept of the majority of acquittee
statutes providing for a judicial hearing. A number of states, however,
specifically do not require full hearings. Hawaii and Virginia, for example,

STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.8(a); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-115(1) (1986); UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987).
130. An application for release is permissible at any time as provided by: FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.218 (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.15(2) (West Supp. 1987); IOWA R. CRIM. P.
21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)) (upon report of chief medical
officer); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2) (Supp. 1986) (for mental health official); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-3703(l) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(0, (g) (1984).
131. An application for release is permitted at any time by persons other than an acquittee
as provided by: FLA. R. CuIM. P. 3.218 (West Supp. 1987) (hospital administrator); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 916.15(2) (West Supp. 1987) (hospital administrator); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2)
(Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987) (hospital director).
132. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987).
133. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-118(a)(2) (Supp. 1986).
134. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(0, (g) (1984).

135. OR. REv. STAT. § 161.346
requires judicial endorsement via a
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257n
136. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. §

(1985). As indicated, in Connecticut absolute discharge
court hearing on the PSRB's determination to this effect.
(West Supp. 1987).

330.2050(5) (West 1980).
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provide that the court may base release on the psychiatric report alone. 37
Courts showing such deference toward the medical/administrative decision
are in effect reducing their role to a ministerial one. The statutes of a few
other states appear to go further yet, eliminating in certain instances even
the court's ministerial role where there is no genuine issue or contest. These
provisions require judicial involvement only if the prosecutor objects to the
administrative decision to discharge the acquittee.'3 8
4.

Criteria for release

The release provisions of the insanity acquittee statutes posit three basic
criteria that must be met before an acquittee can be legally discharged. The
acquittee must be (1) no longer dangerous to others, (2) no longer dangerous
to himself, and (3) no longer mentally ill. A substantial majority of the
states require satisfaction of all three conditions, though the dangerousness
to self and mental illness components are not quite as prevalent as the
requirement that the acquittee be no longer dangerous to others.13 9 By and

137. HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-415 (1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Supp. 1986). In
Montana, also, the court may release the acquittee on the basis of the psychiatric report, but
only if application was made by a mental health official. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-302(3)
(1985).
138. A judicial hearing on release is not required unless the release is objected to as provided
by: D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981) (by prosecutor or court); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3)
(Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(e) (West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
552.040(5) (Vernon 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.460(1) (1979 & Supp. 1984); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 135:28-a (1977) (by prosecutor or court); N.Y. CReM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(13) (McKinney
Supp. 1987); Osno REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.40(D)(4) (Anderson 1987) (committing court will
conduct a hearing at the trial court's request); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (West 1986);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.5 (Supp. 1987) (by prosecutor or court); TEx. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE § 27-6A-4 (1986) (if
court objects to proposed release).
139. The following statutes make reference to all three conditions: ARz. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-3994(C) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(5) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e)
(West Supp. 1987); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-8-120(1) (1986); ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 10052-4(h) (1985); IOWA R. CR1. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp.
1987)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(l) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN.
§ 12-113(b) (Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3703(2) (1985); N.Y. CRn1. PROC. LAW §
330.20(8), (9), (12), (13) (McKinney Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Supp. 1986);
WYo. STAT. § 7-11-306(g) (1977). Many states require lack of dangerousness to self and others
without additional proof regarding continued mental illness. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17257a(10) (West Supp. 1987); HAW. REv. STAT. § 704-415 (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 223428(3), 22-3428a(l), (3) (Supp. 1986) (release permissible if patient continues treatment); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(6) (Vernon
1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-302(1), (3) (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:4-9(b) (West 1982);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(a), (h) (1984); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 17-24-40(C)(2)(c), 44-17-580
(Law. Co-op. 1985); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985). Still others require lack of
mental illness and dangerousness to others, without requiring proof of lack of dangerousness
to self. ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(g) (1975 & Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN tit. 22, § 1161
(West 1986); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.341(4)(b), 161.346(l)(a), 161.351(1) (1985). Some states
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large, the release criteria state the inverse of the specific standards for the
commitment of insanity acquittees. These criteria also are not very different
from the civil commitment release criteria, which in recent years have
gravitated toward a comparably heavy emphasis on the issue of the patient's
dangerousness to others.
Deviations from this general pattern are relatively few. Illinois employs
the criterion that the acquittee be no longer in need of treatment as one of
several possible measures, while New Hampshire and Vermont use it as the
sole standard.' 40 Six states state the criteria for release in terms of the
acquittee no longer meeting the standards for involuntary civil hospitalization.1 41 Another three jurisdictions add that the acquittee must no longer be
dangerous to property. 42 Colorado employs the unique requirement that the
acquittee must be capable of distinguishing right from wrong and have
substantial capacity to conform conduct to the requirements of the law. In
43
other words, the acquittee must recover the sense of criminal responsibility.1
The rationale for this provision appears dubious. Even though criminal
irresponsibility was the ground for the defendant's acquittal, it is not technically the reason for confinement. In Oregon and Wyoming, the statutes
hedge on the dangerousness to others criterion by adding that the acquittee
may be released conditionally even though still a risk, so long as control
with appropriate supervision and treatment is feasible.,5.

Producing the evidence

Most of the insanity acquittee statutes specify what type of evidence may
be presented and who may present it at the acquittee's release hearing. The

merely require lack of dangerousness to others. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 403(b) (Supp. 1986);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.5(l) (Supp. 1987) (or to property); WASH. REy. CODE
ANN. §§ 10.77.150(2), 10.77.200(2) (Supp. 1987). Still others require no more than lack of
mental illness alone. NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.521(2) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp.
1987). California joins the latter after Jan. 1, 1989. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(e) (West Supp.
1987).
140. An acquittee must no longer be in need of treatment prior to release as provided by:
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(h) (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:28 (1977) (further
detention unnecessary in superintendent's opinion); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(c) (Supp.
1986).
141. Release is permissible if the acquittee no longer meets the criteria for civil commitment
as provided by: Asuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(C) (Supp. 1986); FLA. R. CRIE. P. 3.218
(West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.15(2) (West Supp. 1987); GA. CODE ANN. § 271503(3)(f) (Harrison Supp. 1986); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16 (West 1987); MICH.
CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2050(5) (West 1980); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(dX5)
(Vernon Supp. 1987).
142. An acquittee must no longer be dangerous to property prior to release as provided by:
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(5) (1977) (but may still be mentally ill); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704415 (1985); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-113(b) (Supp. 1986).
143. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 16-8-120(3) (1986).
144. OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.336(1), 161.341(4)(c), 161.346(l)(b) (1985); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11306(g) (1977).
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majority of states list two or three authorities who may give evidence,
typically including the director of the hospital where the acquittee is con-

fined,1 4 one or several physicians or clinical psychologists, 14 and occasionally
a central administrative figure such as the director or commissioner of the
department of mental health. 47 The physicians who may testify include the
treating psychiatrists' and independent professionals retained or requested
by the acquittee, or even those retained by the prosecutor, and approved by

the court. 49 Several states ensure independent or impartial testimony via
statutory stipulations to the effect that at least one of the testifying psychiatrists not be affiliated with the treating institution.150 States that operate
with special administrative entities for determining the placement and treatment of mentally disordered offenders have more unusual provisions. Thus,

Louisiana and Nevada require testimony on release from a special "sanity

145. A hospital director may give evidence at a release hearing as provided by: ARK. STAT.
§ 41-613(1) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(b) (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-257c(b) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. R. CRUA. P. 3.218 (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 916.15(3) (West 1985) (hospital administrator's report); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para.
1005-2-4(d) (1985); IOWA R. CRIM. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West
Supp. 1987)); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428a(1) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
655(C) (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(4) (Vernon 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.341(2)
(1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(h) (1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987);
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2) (Supp. 1986) (director's report); WYo. STAT. § 7-11-306(e), (f)
(1977) (facility head's report).
146. Physicians or psychologists may give evidence at a release hearing as provided by: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-613(3) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-8-106(1), 16-8-108 (1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. AN. §§ 17-257c(c), 17-257q(a) (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-414 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(f) (1985); KAN.
STAT. AN. § 22-3428a(2) (Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(l) (Supp. 1986);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(4) (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-302(2) (1985); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.455 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West 1982); N.Y.
CraIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(20) (McKinney 1983); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.341(3), 161.346(3)
(1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2) (Supp. 1986).
147. A central administrator may give evidence at a release hearing as provided by: Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 552.040(4) (Vernon 1987) (Director of Department of Mental Health); NEV. REV.
STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.450 (1985) (mental health administrator); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.34(h) (1984) (Director of Department of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals).
148. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 104-A(l) (Supp. 1986).
149. Independent professionals are permitted at a release hearing as provided by: CoLo. REV.
STAT. §§ 16-8-106(1), 16-8-108(1) (1986) (at request of prosecutor or acquittee); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17-257c(c), 17-257q(a) (West Supp. 1987) (prosecutor or acquittee); FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.218(b) (West Supp. 1987) (prosecutor or acquittee); HAW. RE. STAT. § 704-414
(1985) (acquittee); KANc. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428a(2) (Supp. 1986) (acquittee); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 656 (West 1981) (acquittee or prosecutor); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552-040(4)
(Vernon 1987) (acquittee or prosecutor); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(c) (Supp. 1986)
(prosecutor).
150. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.521(2), 178.455(1) (1985) (at least one of three physicians
appointed by court must be a psychiatrist not affiliated with state mental health office); N.J.
STAT. AN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West 1982) (court may appoint at least two psychiatrists not on the
hospital's staff); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2) (Supp. 1986) (one of two qualified psychiatrists
must be an employee of a state hospital other than acquittee's).
ANN.
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commission," which in Louisiana, plays a role in the original trial. 5' In
Nevada, the commission is not involved in the original trial.'5 2 Oregon admits
the reports of psychiatrists or psychologists appointed by its PSRB.' 53 Maryland provides for a special hearing officer to take evidence on release and
154
report it to the court.

Where specified, the most common statutory formulation on the type of
evidence that may be presented at the release hearing is that which speaks
to the mental condition of the acquittee.155 Several states add that any other
relevant or pertinent evidence may be included. 56 Three states provide that
the testimony address and resolve the release issue in terms of whether the
acquittee meets the release criteria, which as spelled out in at least one
statute, amount to no longer meeting the criteria for commitment. 5 7 The
ABA Standards explicitly apply the normal rules of evidence in release
hearings for insanity acquittees, a statutory detail adopted so far only in the
state of Washington.' 8
6. Burdens and standards of proof
In the majority of states, proof of the acquittee's fitness for release requires
only a preponderance of the evidence, the traditional standard of proof in
civil matters. 59 Six states require clear and convincing evidence, 160 the modern

151.
152.
153.
154.

LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 656 (West 1981).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.521(2) (1985).
OR. REv. STAT. § 161.346(3) (1985).
MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-114(a) (Supp. 1986).
155. See, e.g., ARc. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(3) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-107 (1986);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981); HAW. REv. STAT. § 704-414 (1985) (physical and mental
condition); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (Supp. 1986) (mental evaluation); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 552.040(4) (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-302(2) (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:49(a) (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(12) (McKinney Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(h) (1984); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2) (Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. § 7-11306(h) (1977).
156. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(4) (1977) (any party may offer other evidence on the issues
presented); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257q (West Supp. 1987) (all material evidence); IOWA
R. CRIM. P. 21(8)(e) (codified at IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West Supp. 1987)); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(h) (1984); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306(h) (1977).
157. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(5) (1977); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(d) (1985)
(acquittee must no longer meet commitment criteria); LA. CODE Cum.PROC. ANN. arts. 655(B),
656 (West 1981 & Supp. 1987).
158. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.5; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.100 (1980).
159. Fitness for release must be established by a preponderance of the evidence as provided
by: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(k) (West Supp. 1987) (this provision only in effect until Jan.
1, 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-8-115(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257n(f) (West
Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2)(B) (1981); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12113(d), 12-117(a) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-301(3), 46-14-302(4) (1985); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(b) (West 1982); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.341(5) (1985) (if acquittee applies);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26.12.3 (Supp. 1987) (with respect to any offense involving

210
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standard in civil commitment cases. Given the importance of preserving
physical liberty, a higher standard for commitment than for release may be
justified. South Dakota raises the standard of proof in release proceedings
to clear and convincing only for acquittees whose offenses involved bodily
injury, property damage, or the substantial risk of either.' 6' The ABA
Standards require the preponderance of evidence standard when the state or
the hospital petitions for the acquittee's release, 162 while requiring the slightly
higher clear and convincing proof when the acquittee applies., 63 New Hampshire, up until repeal of the provision only a year or two ago, remained the
only state requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt of fitness for release. '6
This criminal process standard may in the past have seemed more appropriate
for insanity acquittee cases than it does in today's more "progressive" era.
Most states put the burden of persuasion on the acquittee, presumably the
most likely person to petition for release. 165 States such as Illinois, Oregon,
and Wyoming place the burden on the acquittee as the applicant, but shift
it when the state or the hospital is the moving party.'6 6 The ABA Standards,
whether through oversight or some calculation involving the higher than
usual burden of proof on the acquittee, put the burden of persuasion on
67
the state, without regard to who petitions for release.'

bodily injury or damage to another's property, or the substantial risk thereof); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.77.200(2) (Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306(e), (f) (1977).
160. Fitness for release must be established by clear and convincing evidence as provided by:
ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(e) (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(B) (Supp. 1986); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(g) (1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(h) (1984); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 17-24-40(c)(2)(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CoDnED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.3 (Supp.
1987) (with respect to offenses other than one involving bodily injury or damage to another's
property or the substantial risk thereof).
161. S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.3 (Supp. 1987). See supra notes 159 & 160.
162. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.9(e).
163. Id. § 7-7.8(b).
164. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:l1-a(l) (1986) (clear and convincing evidence now required).
165. The burden of persuasion regarding release is placed on the acquittee as provided by:
ALASKA STAT. 12.47.090(e) (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(C) (Supp. 1986); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1026.2(k) (West Supp. 1987) (at least until Jan. 1, 1989); COLO. REV. STAT. §
16-8-115(2) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257n(f) (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN.
§ 24-301(d)(2)(B) (1981); GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503(f)(2) (Harrison Supp. 1986); ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(g) (1985); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp.
1987); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-113(d), 12-117(a) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 46-14-301(3), 46-14-302(4) (1985); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.341(5) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-26-12.3 (Supp. 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-5(3) (Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-181(3) (Supp. 1986); WASH. RED. CODE ANN. § 10.77.200(2) (Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT.
§ 7-11-306(f) (1977).
166. The burden of persuasion is shifted when the state seeks a hearing as provided by: ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(g) (1985) (when state seeks review of facility director's plans
for acquittee); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.341(5) (1985) (burden shifts to the state if the acquittee
applies more than two years after the state last had the burden of proof); WYO. STAT. § 7-11306(e), (f) (1977) (when state opposes facility's application for discharge).
167. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.8(b).
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7. Legal representation
The statutes of some fourteen jurisdictions explicitly provide that the
insanity acquittee has a right to counsel at the release hearing. 68 This number
lags significantly behind the nearly universal endorsement of the right to
counsel at the commitment stage. 69 The reasons may be (a) that the need
to ensure procedural due process and to protect against commitment without
good grounds is more compelling than the right to seek release once properly
committed, and (b) that release procedures are sometimes, or ought to be,
of such informality as not to require the presence of counsel. Be that as it
may, it is difficult to believe that the court in a formal release hearing would
deny the acquittee counsel, irrespective of whether there is statutory language
on the question.
The ABA Standards and the statutes of four states explicitly provide that
the state shall pay for the counsel of indigent acquittees.170 The ABA
Standards further propose that such counsel be available at the locus of
confinement,' 71 but this provision has not yet been duplicated in the state
statutes. Maryland, which requires an initial hearing on release in front of
a hearing officer, before the issue goes to the court, provides for the right
72
to counsel at both junctures.
8.

Type of release: unconditional, conditional

The classic practice and theory on institutional release are to provide for
the absolute, unconditional discharge of inmates once the law or behavioral
indicators dictate that the time is right. The classic pattern applies whether
the confining institution is a prison or a mental hospital, and whether the
person confined has been civilly or criminally committed. At the same time,
however, there exists a well established alternative tradition providing for
the conditional discharge of institutionalized persons. The animating principle
is that the state may take an early chance on certain inmates by releasing

168. Statutes providing for the right to counsel at a release hearing: CoLo. REV. STAT. § 168-119 (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-257q(d), 17-257s(a) (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE
ANN.

§ 24-301(d)(2)(A) (1981);

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 916.15(3) (West 1985);

GA. CODE ANN. §

27-1503(e)(2) (Harrison Supp. 1986); ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(c) (1985); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(6) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-116(b)(2)
(Supp. 1986); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-3704 (1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:30-a(I) (1977);
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.346(6)(d), 161.346(11) (1985); S.D. CODFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-46-3
(Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-182(a) (1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.020(1)
(1980).
169. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
170. Statutes providing for payment for an acquittee's counsel at a release hearing: ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 9, §§ 7-7.5(b), 7-7.8(c); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(6) (Supp.
1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135:30-a(I) (1977); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-46-3
(Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.020(1) (1980).
171. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.8(c).
172. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-114(e)(5), 12-116(b)(2) (Supp. 1986).
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them on parole or some similar supervision scheme. Release may be contingent on: submission to a prescribed regimen of treatment; observation of
various restrictions, including reporting requirements on the acquittee's
whereabouts; and/or adherence to any of a wide range of other stipulations
imposed in response to specific aberrant behavior to which the inmate may
be prone. In recent years, a particular emphasis has been placed on the
conditional discharge alternative, in both the criminal and civil confinement
contexts, in reaction to overflowing institutions as well as for broader
economic and humanitarian reasons. The conditional discharge concept appears to have special advantages in cases involving insanity acquittees, given
the special public safety concerns posed by this population and the perceived
need to allow their re-entry into the community only if continued treatment,
tight supervision, and regular monitoring of their condition are assured. As
a result, a large majority of the states that have enacted special insanity
acquittee statutes include an elaborate set of conditional release provisions
as an alternative to classic unconditional discharge.' The remainder of this
Article's statutory discussion focuses on the details of these conditional
release provisions.
9.

Types of conditions

The statutes describing the kinds of conditions placed on the acquittee as
part of his release often (in at least twelve jurisdictions) make specific
reference to a supervision program or supervising agent entrusted with this
oversight responsibility. 7 4 In four states, the probation authority is designated

173. Conditional release provisions are generally provided by: ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 133994(C) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-612(1)(c), 41-613(5) (1977); CAL. PENAL CODE §
1026.2(e) (West Supp. 1987) (provision in effect until Jan. 1, 1989); CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-8115(3) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257i, j, k (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. §
24-301(e) (1981); FLA. R. CRIm. P. 3.219(a) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.17 (West
1985 & Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 704-413, 704-415 (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 1005-2-4(h) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3), (4), (5) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 104-A(1) (Supp. 1986); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-115(b), 12-118(c), 12-120, 12-121 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 552.040(9) (Vernon 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-301(4), 46-14-302(3), 46-14302(4), 46-14-303 (1985); NEa. REV. STAT. § 29-3703(2) (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 651:11 a(IV) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(b) (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(12)
(McKinney Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.336 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(C)(2)(c)
(Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIFED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.5 (Supp. 1987); TEX. CRm. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Supp. 1986);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.150 (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985);
Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306(c) (1977).
174. Provisions for supervision of an acquittee on conditional release are provided by: CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257j (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981); FLA. R.
Cim. P. 3.219(a) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.17(1) (West 1985); HAW. REv.
STAT. § 704-416.5(1) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 658(B) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(1)(A) (Supp.
1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:11-a(IV) (1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(12)
(McKinney Supp. 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.336(l) (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.77.160 (1980); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-306(c), (g) (1977).
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either as the responsible agency or as one possible supervisor. 175 In Kansas
and Washington, a physician may undertake the supervisory responsibility. 176
In New York, the Commissioner of Mental Health serves as the acquittee's

supervisor. 177 And in Oregon, it is up to the PSRB to designate the appropriate agent to monitor the conditionally released acquittee.178
The courts typically have the authority to impose and choose the conditions
for the acquittee's release. The state statutes give the judiciary wide discretion

in exercising this authority. At least eleven states simply provide that the
court may order such conditions as it deems necessary or appropriate. 179 In
some states this judicial discretion may not go beyond the recommendations
of a special administrative agent, such as a hearing officer in Maryland or
the commissioner of mental health and retardation in Virginia. By statute,

these officers have the responsibility to make the initial evaluation in this
regard. 8 0 Some nine states make specific reference in their statutes to the
court's power to order outpatient treatment as a condition of release. 8'
Other state statutes specify the various treatment, training, vocational and
18 2
educational options that the court may consider in setting the conditions.
New York's law is unique in that it requires the conditions to be in the form
of a written service plan prepared and approved by the court.'83 The ABA

Standards embody a particular focus in that they require acquittees whose

175. A probation officer supervises an acquittee as provided by: HAW. RaV. STAT. § 704416.5(1) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(4)(a) (Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 104-A(1) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.160 (1980 & Supp. 1987).
176. A physician may supervise an acquittee as provided by: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(3)
(Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.160 (1980 & Supp. 1986).
177. N.Y. CRnM. PRoC. LAW § 330.20(12) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
178. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.336(1) (1985).
179. Courts are given full discretion regarding release conditions as provided by: ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-613(5) (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981); HAW. REv. STAT. § 704-413
(1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(h) (1985); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-14-301(4),
46-14-302(3), 46-14-302(4), 46-14-303 (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(b) (West 1982); N.Y.
CRWa.PROC. LAW § 330.20(12) (McKinney Supp. 1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(c)(2)(c)
(Law. Co-op. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(3) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.77.150(2) (Supp. 1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985).
180. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-118(c)(5) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2181(3) (Supp. 1986).
181. Courts may order outpatient treatment as a condition of release as provided by: FLA.
R. CRmI. P. 3.219(2) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.17(1)(b) (West 1985); ILL.
REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(a) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(4) (Supp. 1986); ME.
REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 104-A(1)(A) (Supp. 1986); NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-3703(2) (1985) (treatment
under least restrictive setting mandated by statute); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(12)
(McKinney Supp. 1987); OR. Rev. STAT. § 161.336(4)(a) (1985); TEx. CItnA. PROC. CODE ANN.
§ 46.03(4)(d)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.150(3) (Supp. 1987).
182. Release conditions are specified by: ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(a)(1)(C)
(1985) (drug rehabilitation programs, community adjustment programs); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-3428(4) (Supp. 1986) (guidance counselling); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.150(1) (Supp.
1987) (conditional release may contemplate partial release for work, training, or educational
purposes).
183. N.Y. CaiA. PRoc. LAW § 330.20(12) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
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sanity appears to be a direct result of treatment to continue such treatment

when conditionally released. 184 Kansas, in a unique provision, requires that
the acquittee, as a condition of release, waive extradition proceedings in case
85
an arrest warrant is issued.
10.

Modification of conditions

Eleven states have laws that specifically address the possibility of modifying
the release conditions imposed on the insanity acquittee.' 8 6 It is probable,
however, that modifications can be made even in states without such statutory
provisions. Eight of the jurisdictions having such laws designate that the
acquittee may apply to modify the terms of release. s7 Other parties with a
compelling interest in the matter are the court (listed in the statutes of three
states), 8' the prosecutor (two states),

s9

the person supervising the acquittee

while on conditional release (four states),' 90 and interested parties, such as
the acquittee's spouse and next of kin (Maine).' 9' In addition, six jurisdictions
also grant an official of the department of mental health services the authority
to apply for a change in release conditions.

92

184. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.4(d).
185. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(4) (Supp. 1986).
186. Provisions for modifying release conditions are provided by: ARK. STAT. An. § 41614 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2571 (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(k)
(1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(2) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(5) (Supp. 1986); LA.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 658 (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104A(2)-(5) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-120, 12-121(a) (Supp. 1986); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 161.336(7), 161.341(5) (1985); TEX. CRm. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6)
(Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.190 (Supp. 1987).
187. An acquittee may petition for modification of release conditions as provided by: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-614(1) (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2571 (West Supp. 1987); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-301(k)(1) (1981); HAW. Rv. STAT. § 704-413(2) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
22-3428(5) (Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(2) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. § 12-121(a)(1)(ii) (Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.336(7)(a) (1985).
188. A court may modify release conditions as provided by: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-614(2)
(1977); ME. Rav. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(4) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
10.77.190(2) (Supp. 1987).
189. A prosecutor may petition for modifications as provided by: MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. §§ 12-120(a)(3), 12-121(a)(l)(i) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.190(2)
(Supp. 1987).
190. An acquittee's supervisor may petition for modifications as provided by: KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 22-3428(5) (Supp. 1986); OR. REv. STAT. § 161.336(7)(b) (1985); TEX. CIMu,. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.190(2)
(Supp. 1987).
191. A spouse and next of kin may petition as provided by: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 104-A(3) (Supp. 1986).
192. A mental health official may petition as provided by: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 172571 (West Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(l) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(5)
(Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-119(l), 12-120(b)(2), 12-121(a)(l)(i) (Supp.
1986); TEx. CRnM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.77.190(2) (Supp. 1987).
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Several states and the District of Columbia have limits on how soon or
how often modifications may be requested. A six month wait between
applications is the most common frequency limitation.193 Hawaii requires the
applicant to wait one year before applying for modification. 194 In Kansas, a
request is permissible "any time," 19 while Wyoming's unique provision says
1 96
that modifications may be applied for "from time to time.'
The criteria for modifying conditions of release fall into four basic categories. Most states employ the failure of the released acquittee to meet or
comply with the conditions imposed as one standard of modification. 197
Louisiana is unique in that its statute provides that modification may be
granted because the acquittee is about to violate the conditions, a reasonable
preventative measure that may be operative even in jurisdictions that provide
no such statutory authorization.' 98 The other basic criteria reflect the acquittee's need for additional or new conditions, either because of renewed
dangerousness' 99 or because of deteriorating mental health. 200 Finally, and
appropriately enough, three states also permit modifications based on improvement in the acquittee's mental condition that would make a continuation of the original restrictions unnecessary, and possibly justify unconditional
discharge.2 01
193. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2571(b) (West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(k)(5)
(1981); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.336(7)(a), 161.341(5) (1985). In Maryland, the initial application
cannot come earlier than six months after the conditional release, and subsequent applications
must not be made more often than annually unless the application is accompanied by the
affidavit of a physician or psychologist. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-121(a)(1)(ii), 12121(d) (Supp. 1986).
194. HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(2) (1985).
195. KA. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(5) (Supp. 1986).
196. WYo. STAT. § 7-11-306(c) (1977).
197. Modification of release conditions may be based on lack of compliance as provided by:
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257o (West Supp. 1987); FLA. R. CIum. P. 3.219(b) (West Supp.
1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.17(2) (West Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(3) (1985);
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(i) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3428(5), 22-3428(b)
(1981 & Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRmI. PROC. ANN. art. 658(B) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(4) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-120(c) (Supp.
1986); TEX. CRIw. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.77.190(3) (Supp. 1987).
198. LA. CODE CRrm. PRoc. ANN. art. 658(B) (West Supp. 1987).
199. Modification may be based on renewed dangerousness as provided by: ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-614(2) (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(3) (1985); LA. CODE CRIm. PROC. ANN. art.
658(A) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(5) (Supp. 1986).
200. Modification may be based on deteriorating mental health as provided by: CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-257o (West Supp. 1987); FLA. R. Cirm. P. 3.219(b) (West Supp. 1987); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 916.17(2) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(5) (Supp.
1986); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. RaV. CODE
ANN. § 10.77.190(1) (Supp. 1987).
201. Modification may be based on improvement in mental health as provided by: ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 41-614(1) (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(2) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. §
161.336(7)(a) (1985). The statutory formulation is no longer mentally ill or, if still so affected,
no longer presents a substantial danger, and as in Oregon, "no longer requires supervision,
medication, care or treatment." Id.

216
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Modifying the release conditions is an action of considerable moment to
the acquittee, to the supervising or treating agent, and to the general public
which expects protection against persons who have a history of dangerous
behavior. As a result, modifications require formal legal procedures to
protect the competing interests. The relevant statutes generally mandate a
judicial hearing.202 Connecticut and Oregon, however, vest the responsibility
20 1
and the authority to hear the petitions in special review boards.
11.

Revocation of release

There are substantial similarities between the provisions on modification
of release conditions and those that govern the possibility of revocation of
release or its conditions. However, the logic of the law also dictates certain
differences. For a comparative analysis, it is perhaps most instructive to
focus on the differences.
The revocation statutes, logically enough, do not designate the acquittee
as a possible applicant. The thrust of revocation is not to free the acquittee
from the conditions imposed as part of the release, but to revoke the release
and to order reinstitutionalization, something very few acquittees will perceive
as being in their own interest. Also, revocation is intended principally as a
response to the exigencies of the situation, frequently an emergency, and as
such there is no limit on how frequently the revocation process may be
initiated, as there is in respect to modifications.
The criteria for revocation of release also differ in certain respects from
those guiding modification decisions. Based on the same logic that precludes
the acquittee from being listed as an applicant for revocation, the main
difference is that improvement in mental condition is not a ground for
revocation, whereas it is a legal basis for modification in several state
statutes. 20 The objective of the revocation statute is not discharge, but its

precise opposite. Beyond this difference, the similarities dominate. Just as
they can be grounds for modification, the acquittee's deteriorating mental
health, 0 5 renewed dangerousness, 2 06 or failure to meet the conditions of

202. A judicial hearing is required for modification as provided by: ARK. STAT. Am. § 41614 (1977); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.219(b) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.17(2) (West
Supp. 1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(2), (3) (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-24(i) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(5) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CIWA. PRoC. ANN. art. 658
(West Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 104-A(4), 104-A(5) (Supp. 1986); TEX.
CR1. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.12-181(3)
(Supp. 1986); WASH. Ruv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.190(3) (Supp. 1987); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306(c),
(g) (1977).
203. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257a (West Supp. 1987); OR. REv. STAT. §§ 161.336(7),
161.346(1) (1985).
204. See supra note 201.
205. Deteriorating mental health is grounds for revocation of release as provided by: COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 16-8-102(4.5), 16-8-115.5(8) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257o (West
Supp. 1987); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.219(b) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.17(2) (West
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release 2°7 all can be grounds for revocation. Presumably, there is a difference
of degree, with the greater changes in the acquittee's condition or the larger
shortfalls from compliance calling for revocation, whereas modification is
the answer for smaller deviations, but the statutes do not spell this out.
Texas has a unique provision that requires the acquittee to meet the criteria
for involuntary civil commitment in order to be reinstitutionalized. 28 Wyoming has a unique provision that uses inability to control the acquittee adequately by supervision alone as the explicit criterion for revocation. 209
Perhaps the most critical legal difference between revocation and modification decisions is that the former may be made, at least in a number of
states, without a formal judicial hearing. 210 The rationale no doubt is that
the drastic step of revocation is often a response to an emergency situation,
while the intermediate action of modifying the release conditions rarely is,
and thus can be more deliberate. The statutes that permit revocation without
formal proceedings contemplate an eventual formal hearing on the revocation
decision, but only after passage of a reasonable period of time. In general,
the time prescribed is short: seventy-two hours in Hawaii;2 1 1 seven days in
Maine; 212 and, in Texas and Washington simply until such time as a hearing
can be scheduled. 213 The Maryland statutes contain the unique provision that

Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(5) (Supp. 1986); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.336(5)
(1985); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
206. Renewed dangerousness is grounds for revocation as provided by: ARK. STAT. ANN. §
41-614(2) (1977); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 16-8-102(4.5), 16-8-115.5(8) (1986); HAW. REv. STAT. §
704-413(3) (1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(5) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 46-14-304 (1985); N.Y. CRnIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(14) (McKinney Supp. 1987); OR. REV.
STAT. § 161.336(5) (1985); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(3) (West 1985).
207. Failure to meet conditions is grounds for revocation as provided by: CoLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 16-8-102(4.5), 16-8-115.5(8) (1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257o (West Supp. 1987);
FLA. R. CRIM. P.

3.219(b) (West Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 916.17(2) (West Supp. 1987);

HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(3) (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(i) (1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 22-3428(5), 22-3428b (1981 & Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRim. PROC. ANN. art.
658(B) (West Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(4) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. § 12-120(c) (Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-304 (1985); OR. REv.
STAT. § 161.336(5) (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-26-12.6 (Supp. 1987); TEX. CRIM.
PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.190(3)
(Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(3) (West 1985).
208. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
209. WYO STAT. § 7-11-306(c), (g) (1977).
210. HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(1) (1985) (by probation officer for no more than seventytwo hours); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(4) (Supp. 1986) (by commissioner of mental
health, with hearing within seven days); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-120(f) (Supp.
1986) ("body attachment" permitted after ex parte hearing on petition for revocation); OR.
REv. STAT. § 161.336(5) (1985) (written order of PSRB sufficient); TEX. CaIm. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.190(2) (Supp.
1987).
211. HAW. REv. STAT. § 704-413(1) (1985).
212. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(5) (Supp. 1986) (apparently a person may be
rehospitalized for up to seven days without a hearing).
213. TEx. CRIm. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 10.77.190(2) (Supp. 1987).
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the parties may agree to waive the revocation hearing. 214 Uniformly, the
statutes prescribe a judicial proceeding to test the initial revocation decision,
and Connecticut and Oregon prescribe a hearing before their administrative
review boards." '
12.

Maximum period for release conditions

Consistent with the legal trend against indeterminate confinement, many
of today's release conditions spell out limits for how long the conditions
may remain in force. Five years is a common statutory maximum, with
provisions in Maryland and New Hampshire adding that the court, upon a
hearing, may extend the limits for another five years.21 6 In Connecticut, the
release conditions may remain in force as long as the maximum authorized
period of confinement.2"7 In Oregon and South Carolina, the release conditions imposed on an insanity acquittee may not persist beyond the time of
the maximum sentence that the acquittee could have received if convicted
on the criminal charge." 8 In Maine and Texas, the statutes provide simply
that the duration of the conditions is set by the court, with the added proviso
in Texas that the court may, upon expiration of the original period, order
a new time limit.21 9 Louisiana law provides that the time for release conditions
220
may be either fixed or indeterminate.
13.

Mandatory outpatient treatment

For economic, rehabilitative, and humanitarian reasons, the law has recently given voice to the theory that, in a variety of personal and legal
circumstances, mentally disabled individuals may best be treated on an
outpatient basis. The insanity acquittee statutes reflect this trend with provisions that permit outpatient evaluations and outpatient treatment as an
alternative to institutionalization. 221 The flip side of the coin is that insanity
acquittees who are ready for release may be required to follow a regimen of
outpatient treatment as a condition of their discharge. As mentioned, several
state statutes explicitly give the court the option to impose such treatment. 222

214. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-120(0(1) (Supp. 1986).
215. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2570(c) (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.336(5)
(1985).
216. MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-121(c)(5) (Supp. 1986); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §
651:11-a(I) (1986). See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(a)(1)(D) (1985).
217. Such at least was the explicit law under the old code. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)47(g) (1972). The same limitation is still implied. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-257c(e)(1)(A)
(West Supp. 1987).
218. OR. REV. STAT. § 161.336(8) (1985); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
219. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(1) (Supp. 1986) (subject to annual review); TEX.
CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987).
220. LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 657 (West Supp. 1987).
221. See supra notes 66-75 and accompanying text.
222. Id.
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The law could, however, mandate outpatient treatment not as a judicial
option, but as a statutory requirement that automatically applies to every
insanity acquittee who is released from an institution. The courts and special
programs in several states operate as if such a statutory mandate existed,
the practice being to assign all released insanity acquittees to a regimen of
outpatient treatment. So far, however, only California has actually enacted
a law to this effect. In California, just to be eligible for a formal release
hearing, the acquittee must have undergone a probationary 180 days of
outpatient care. 23 If the court then finds the acquittee ready for formal
release, it requires as part of the release order, outpatient treatment for an
additional one year period unless unconditional release is ordered within that
2
time. 2
14.

Notification requirements

Finally, notification requirements are an important feature of the law
governing the disposition of insanity acquittees. These requirements apply
to facts or developments at various stages of the disposition process, including
the final stages of conditional release and full discharge. Most states require
that notice be given of any application for release, or of the release hearing
itself, including the time and place for the hearing. 225 Perhaps because of
these full preliminary notice requirements, relatively few states explicitly
require notice of the outcome of the process. 226 A few states, in addition,
require notice of modification of release conditions and of revocation of
conditional release. 227 Oregon's statute requires notice to various parties of
periodic progress reports made by the treatment provider regarding the
acquittee's response to the outpatient treatment program. 22 Minnesota man-

223. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(d) (West Supp. 1987) (ninety days, after Jan. 1, 1989).
224. Id. § 1026.2(e) (in effect until Jan. 1, 1989).
225. Notice of a hearing on release is required by: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(e) (1984); Amuz.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(B) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(1) (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1026.2(a), (e) (West Supp. 1987); COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-8-115(3)(b) (1986); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-301(d)(2)(B) (1981); HAW. Rv. STAT. § 704-412(1), (2) (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, para. 1005-2-4(d)(3) (1985); LA. CODE CRI. PROC. ANN. arts. 655(C), 657 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1987); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(6) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE
ANN. § 12-114(c)(2), (d)(1) (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(4) (Vernon 1987); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-14-301(3) (1985); N.H. REv. STAT. AiNN. § 135:30-a(IV) (1977); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.70(8), (9), (12), (13), (18)
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40.1-5.3-4(h) (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 4822(c) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2), (4) (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§
27-6A-3(c), 27-6A-4 (1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985); WYo. STAT. § 7-11306(e), (f) (1977).
226. Oregon does. OR. REv. STAT. § 161.346(9) (1985).
227. Notice of modification of release conditions is required by: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41614(1) (1977); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(k)(3) (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-413(2) (1985);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(5) (Supp. 1986); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.20(14) (McKinney
Supp. 1987).
228. OR. REv. STAT. § 161.336(4)(d) (1985) (acquittee and counsel).
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dates notice of discharge only in cases involving felonies or gross misde-

meanors

229

The main target of the various notification requirements, for reasons that
are self-evident, is the state's prosecutorial machinery, that is, the Attorney
General or county prosecutor. 230 The ABA Standards231 and one state, Arkansas, 232 also mandate notice to the defendant and to counsel, on the
assumption that in some cases the defense may not be the moving party, or
perhaps simply to inform the defendant of the time and place of the hearing.
Other parties are also targeted for notice in some of the states: the supervisor
of the acquittee's treatment regimen, 233 the court, 234 the county sheriff or
municipal police, 23" the facility superintendent, 236 the director of the mental
health department, 23 7 and, in New Hampshire, the nearest relative or guardian

229. MINN. R. CSrM. P. 20.02(8)(4) (West Supp. 1987).
230. Notice to the prosecutor is required by: ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.090(e) (1984); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-3994(B) (Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-613, 41-614 (1977); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1026.2(a) (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-257h, 17-257m(b), 17-257r
(West Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 704-412(1), 704412(2), 704-413(2) (1985); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, paras. 1005-2-4(d)(3), 1005-2-4(f) (1985); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2), (5) (Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 655(C), 657
(West 1981 & Supp. 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 104-A(6) (Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTHGEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-119, 12-120 (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(d)
(West 1987); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(4) (Vernon 1987); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 175.521(2),
178.455(3) (1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West 1982); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 33.20(8),
(9), (12), (13), (14), (18) (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161
(West 1986); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 161.336(5), 161.346(4) (1985); R.1. GEN. LAW § 40.1-5.3-4(h)
(1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(C)(2)(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODnmD LAWS ANN. §
23A-26-12.5 (Supp. 1987); TEx. CRim. PROC. CODE ANN. § 46.03(4)(d)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1987);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(c) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-181(2), (4) (Supp. 1986);
W. VA. CODE §§ 27-6A-3(c), 27-6A-4 (1980 & Supp. 1986); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West
1985); Wyo. STAT. § 7-11-306(e), (f) (1977).
231. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.9(f).
232. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-613(1) (1977).
233. Notice to the acquittee's supervisor is required by: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-614(1) (1977)
(when acquittee seeks modification of release conditions); HAW. REv. STAT. § 704-413(2) (1985).
234. Notice to the court is required by: KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2) (Supp. 1986); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 12-118(b)(I) (Supp. 1986); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 123, § 16(e)
(West 1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135:28-a (1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:4-9(a) (West
1982); OHIo REV. CODE § 2945.40(D)(4) (Anderson 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161
(West 1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-24-40(C)(2)(c) (Law. Co-op. 1985); S.D. CODIMED LAWS
ANN. § 23A-26-12.5 (Supp. 1987); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(c) (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 10.77.190(2) (Supp. 1987) (of apprehension of acquittee upon revocation of
release).
235. Notice to the sheriff or police is required by: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.6 (West 1985 &
Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(m) (1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3428(2)
(Supp. 1986). See also infra note 241 and accompanying text.
236. Notice to the hospital superintendent is required by: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(a) (West
Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(0 (1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(4)
(Vernon 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:30-a(IV) (1977).
237. Notice to the director of mental health is required by: CAL. PENAL CODE § 1026.2(a),
(e) (West Supp. 1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4(m) (1985); MD. HEALTH-GEN.
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of the acquittee. 2 s Uniquely, New York requires that notice of changes in
the acquittee's situation also be given to its Mental Hygiene Legal Service,

239
an agency of the court that functions as a guardian of patients' rights.
Washington's statute requires notice of conditional release to be given to the
trial court. 240 Wisconsin appears to be alone in requiring notice to the police
or sheriff's department for the area where the acquittee will reside following
release. 241

II.

TiE

CASE LAW

There have been reported cases on many of the issues touched upon in
the discussion of the statutes. The purpose of this section is to set out the
way the cases have interpreted the various individual provisions of the states'
statutory schemes for handling insanity acquittees. Some of the cases present
the opportunity for a more integrated analysis, one that emphasizes the
interdependence of the various substantive and procedural components of
the post-verdict treatment of insanity acquittees, and that discerns their
largely unarticulated relationship to pre-verdict standards and procedures.
A.

Due Process, Equal Protection, and the Commitment Alternatives:

The View From the Top
In 1983 the United States Supreme Court decided Jones v. United States, 242
a case deserving of the otherwise overused term "landmark," which seems
destined to frame the debate and litigation over dispositional procedures for
insanity acquittees in years to come. The decision appears to retract the
mandate growing out of a line of earlier Supreme Court cases involving
populations in legal circumstances similar to those of insanity acquittees.
Baxstrom v. Herold,243 Specht v. Patterson,24 and Humphrey v. Cady245 had
mandated the application of basic due process safeguards when deciding on
the commitment of criminally convicted populations to mental facilities.
They were to be treated in all critical respects like non-criminal populations
and accorded the same legal protection of the law as applied to civil
2
commitment candidates or civil patients under O'Connor v. Donaldson 4
247
and Addington v. Texas, the two primary Supreme Court cases delineating

CODE ANN.
GEN. LAWS

238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

§§ 12-118, 12-120 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.040(4) (Vernon 1987); R.I.
§ 40.1-5.3-4(h) (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 4822(c) (Supp. 1986).

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135:30-a(IV) (1977 & Supp. 1986).
N.Y. CnMs. PROC. LAW § 330.20(8), (10), (11), (12), (14) (McKinney Supp. 1987).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.190(2) (Supp. 1987).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 971.17(2) (West 1985).
463 U.S. 354 (1983).
383 U.S. 107 (1966) (allegedly mentally ill prisoners at the expiration of their sentence).
386 U.S. 605 (1967) (allegedly mentally ill defendants convicted of sexual crimes).
405 U.S. 504 (1972) (allegedly mentally ill defendants convicted of sexual crimes).
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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the rights of civil committees. In effect, Jones withdraws support for full
special hearing procedures or regular civil commitment processing as the
required means for determining the post-verdict fate of insanity acquittees.
While the legislative trend in the states toward making these two alternative
dispositional routes available to insanity acquittees may continue, the point
of the Jones holding is that the presumptions flowing from a defendant's
successful assertion of the insanity plea are such as to permit more truncated
processing of the beneficiary of the defense. Either automatic commitment
of insanity acquittees or their expedited commitment by the criminal trial
court based on the trial record is thereby permissible.
Specifically, Jones held that "[w]hen a criminal defendant establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason
of insanity, the Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the
insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental institution until such time'2as
4
he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger to himself or society.
In other words, the result of the criminal trial itself furnishes a sufficient
basis for an automatic, indeterminate commitment of the acquittee. No
special hearing need be held, no new evidence or evidence specifically targeted
to the present propriety of confinement or treatment need be developed, and
neither the standards and procedures for committing the acquittee nor those
for release need conform to the standards and procedures applicable to other
potentially committable or committed populations, criminal or civil.
A number of assumptions, made explicit by the Court, form the basis for
this holding: (1) the verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity is assumed
to be sufficiently probative of continuing mental illness and dangerousness
to justify commitment for the purposes of treatment and the protection of
society;249 (2) the verdict is assumed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the criminal act that led to the charge and
trial; (3) the release hearing to which the acquittee is entitled after a certain
defined period 250 is assumed to provide adequate, if not equal, protection as
248. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
249. There are subsidiary assumptions here about the burden and standard of proof and the
relative risk of error in the decision making process regarding insanity acquittees versus those
involving persons proposed for civil commitment. As the Court put it:
[There are] important differences between the class of potential civil-commitment
candidates and the class of insanity acquittees that justify differing standards of
proof. The Addington Court expressed particular concern that members of the
public could be confined on the basis of 'some abnormal behavior which might be
perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder, but which is
in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable .

. . .'

But since

automatic commitment under D.C. law follows only if the acquittee himself advances
insanity as a defense and proves that his criminal act was a product of his mental
illness, there is good reason for diminished concern as to the risk of error. More
important, the proof that he committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness
eliminates the risk that he is being committed for mere 'idiosyncratic behavior.'
463 U.S. at 367.
250. Fifty days in the case of the defendant in Jones. D.C. CoDE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2) (1981)
(still the law).
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compared to commitment review procedures available to other committed
populations; and (4) indeterminate confinement until the acquittee recovers
sanity and is no longer dangerous is assumed to be more appropriate than
confinements based on length of the potential criminal sentence on the
underlying charge or other irrelevant indicators.
These assumptions, like the holding itself, have come under severe attack
from the mental patients advocacy community. By and large the critiques
have been on legal grounds, and in some instances, rather narrow legal
grounds. At least one challenge, however, is behavioral/psychological in its
predicates. None can be summarily dismissed as meritless.
First the behavioral contention. The assumption of continuing mental
illness and dangerousness based on a finding of criminal irresponsibility for
the criminal act, which not atypically may have occurred many months
before the final verdict, is psychiatrically dubious. Mental illness is often
episodic25' and the defendant's symptoms may be in remission or under
control through medication and other treatments. That there is a need for
post-verdict treatment and confinement, much less how much of each, is
not self-evident. Furthermore, criminal irresponsibility (insanity) is a legal
construct bereft of psychiatric meaning. A judicial finding that the defendant
was not responsible carries no particular diagnostic implications, let alone
prognostic ones that would translate into a specific treatment regimen for
the acquittee.
It is on this last point-the lack of relation between criminal insanity and
present committability regardless of the passage of time or any alterations
in the defendant's mental state-that the psychiatric perspective merges with
the legal one. The legal criteria for assessing criminal responsibility bear no
direct relation to the statutory standards for mental commitment. The assumption that a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity in and of itself
furnishes sufficient grounds for confining the acquittee in a mental facility
involves some significant strain on the law's finer points. The defendant
may have proved his inability to tell right from wrong or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law, but that in itself, the technical legal
argument goes, makes the acquittee neither dangerous nor in need of treatment. The case for the acquittee's automatic commitment is weaker yet
where, as in many jurisdictions, the defense does not have the burden of
proving insanity, but the state must prove the defendant sane.2 12 In such
circumstances, it has been pointed out, the defendant's criminal insanity is

251. Not only is the episodic character of some mental illnesses a well known psychiatric
reality, it is explicitly acknowledged in the criminal law via the long standing exculpatory
doctrines of "irresistible impulse" and "temporary insanity," and is promoted by advocates
of the notion that persons suffering from such newfangled "disabilities" as "post-traumatic
stress disorder" and "premenstrual syndrome" should also be absolved of criminal accountability. See J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 710, 713-14.
252. See J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 769-77 (Table 12.5, column
9, "The Insanity Defense-Pleading and Proof").
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at best only indirectly established and the more remote issue of committability
remains unproved by evidentiary standards normally in force in proceedings
25 31
where the defendant's liberty is at stake.
The assumption that the insanity acquittee committed the criminal act
provides grounds for inferring dangerousness and hence the need for confinement, apart from whatever justifications can be inferred from the finding
of criminal insanity. The validity of this assumption, however, is open to
question in most jurisdictions. In the District of Columbia, as in the majority
of states, a plea of insanity is only an implicit admission that the defendant
has committed a criminal act. 2 4 Indeed, entering the plea may be no more
than a strategic defense decision calculating that, by focusing the court's
inquiry on whether the criminal incident resulted from mental illness, the
best deal (i.e., nonpunitive treatment) will be obtained for the defendant.
Some states even allow simultaneous inconsistent pleas of not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity. 25 At least one jurisdiction permits the introduction of the insanity defense under a general not guilty plea.25 6 Such
procedures would preclude any inferences at all about the defendant's participation in the criminal act. Given this procedural scenario, the ABA
Standards require a special finding by the court that the acquittee committed
the criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby underscoring the Standards' authors' judgment that entry of an insanity plea in itself provides no
grounds for binding presumptions to this effect. 2 7 Such a requirement stands
in direct contrast to the operative assumption in Jones regarding the acquittee's participation in the criminal event.
The assumption in Jones regarding the adequacy of the fifty day release
hearing following an acquittee's automatic commitment has been challenged
for ignoring a number of arguably consequential differences in procedure
and standards between commitment proceedings and release proceedings.

253. Thus, in a criminal trial, the state conceivably could present evidence that by a preponderance of the evidence standard would suffice in a civil proceeding to establish sanity, but
that would not establish it beyond a reasonable doubt. If unrebutted, the same evidence in a
civil proceeding would suffice to show that the defendant could not be committed. See also
Margulies, The "Pandemonium Between the Mad and the Bad:" Proceduresfor the Commitment and Release of Insanity Acquittees After Jones v. United States, 36 RUTGERS L. REV.
793, 804, 819 (1984); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 531, 221 N.W.2d 569, 578 (1974)
(which approved the circuit court's point that "[a]ll that an acquittal by reason of insanity
establishes in law is that the People have failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was competent at the time he committed the crime which might have been months
before").
254. Some states require that the defendant's commission of the criminal act first must be
proved in a separate trial phase before the issue of his criminal responsibility is considered.
See, e.g., State v. Field, 118 Wis. 2d 269, 347 N.W.2d 365 (1984) (discusses Wisconsin's
bifurcated and trifurcated procedures when the insanity defense is invoked).
255. LA. CODE CRrM. PRoc. ANN. art. 650 (West 1981); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, §
40(1) (Supp. 1986).
256. TEx. CODE CRnI. PROC. ANN. § 27.17 (Vernon 1966).
257. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.4(c).
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The burden of persuasion in a release hearing is typically, as it is under the
D.C. Code, 258 on the patient, whereas the state must generally prove the
propriety of commitment or retention. 2 9 In addition, the criteria for release
may be something other than the direct inverse of the commitment criteria
and in effect may make continued confinement more likely than when the
question is whether the acquittee initially should be placed in custody. The
release criteria in the District of Columbia, for example, speak in terms of
the acquittee's nondangerousness "in the reasonable future, ' ' 260 a predictive
burden on the defendant that is almost certainly more onerous than having
to contend with the question of present danger. There are also other divergencies in the procedures for release in several states relating to the standard
of proof and the right to counsel 261 that render a determination in favor of
the acquittee's freedom less likely than under the commitment procedures.
Apart from any concrete differences, the entire "psychology" in release
proceedings may militate against the acquittee's going free in a way that it
does not when the issue is framed in terms of commitment. The sum is that,
whatever the merits of the assumption in Jones that the protection of the
law for acquittees in release hearings is adequate, it is certainly not equal to
that accorded to comparable populations.
As to the justification for indeterminate confinement of insanity acquittees,
the Jones Court's main strategy was to compare it to an alternative, which
is in effect in some states and proposed in others, that is no easier to justify,
namely, confinement determined by the length of the hypothetical criminal
sentence.262 The Court's assertion that punishment has no place in dispositional schemes devised for insanity acquittees is unassailable and there is
little conceivable correlation between the possible criminal sentence and the
length of time necessary for the acquittee's recovery. 26a An interesting reversal
of positions is operative here in that the Jones Court's critics, who impute
punitive motives to the majority opinion, are the ones willing to utilize the
length of the possible sentence as an outer limit to the length of confinement.
While providing an appearance of nonarbitrariness, criminal confinement
limits for the unconvicted are ultimately not defensible. The "principle" of
treating insanity acquittees no worse than convicts is not a principle. Recognizing this, however, need not lead one to espouse indeterminate confinement as the solution. There is an intermediate position that has been touted

258. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2)(B) (1981).
259. See supra note 57-59 and accompanying text.
260. The statutory provisions describing the fifty day release hearing speak only generally of
a court finding that the acquittee is "entitled to release from custody," but later provisions on
administrative and judicial release of acquittees posit the dangerous "in the reasonable future"
criterion. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-301(d)(2)(A), 24-301(3) (1981).
261. See generally supra notes 53-63, 159-72 and accompanying text. See also Margulies,
supra note 253, at 827-35.
262. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69 (1983).
263. Id.
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as preferable to either the inapposite standards of the criminal process or
the potentially deleterious open-endedness of indeterminate confinements.
That position, proposed by a number of legal commentators and adopted
by several state legislatures, requires civil recommitment hearings for all
acquittees a set period of time (five years is typical) after their initial
confinement. 2 6
While these criticisms of the Jones opinion and the assumptions on which
it is predicated appear quite formidable, there is more to the matter than is
in the eye of the beholder-critics. What follows is an attempt to construct
the underlying, only partially articulated, rationales that moved the Court's
majority to decide the case as it did.
Jones is best understood if it is recognized that: (1) the Court's business
is not to assert its own judgment, but only to review the rational basis for
the legislative judgment implicit in the statutory provisions at issue; 265 and
(2) its assessment that the legislation is not unreasonable is grounded on an
appreciation of the rougher realities of the law as applied, as opposed to a
purist effort to follow legal principle to its ultimate, technical conclusion.
The holding permitting truncated processing of insanity acquittees reflects
an awareness of the interconnectedness of the many parts and parcels,
procedural and substantive, that comprise the insanity defense machinery
from the initial plea to final release, and approves a reasonable distribution
between the state and the defendant of the various burdens and strategy
options that go into making legal decisions at critical points in this protracted
process. The decision's underlying balancing calculus is grounded in the
specifics of the D.C. law and the particular course of action the law
prescribed for the Jones defendant, but it has implications for jurisdictions
with similar legislative schemes. The crux of the Court's reasoning seems to
be that a defendant who succeeds with a defense of insanity and who at the
next legal decision making juncture proceeds to disavow insanity, is not
entitled to the same presumptions of innocence (sanity) as a person who
does not have this tainted background. The rough inverse of this proposition
was established years before by the Court in Lynch v. Overholser,2 s which
held that the automatic commitment process prescribed by the D.C. Code
applied only to defendants who initiated the insanity defense, and could not
be used to commit those who had the defense imposed on them. This is the
point of departure of Jones. It is what leads the Court to its conclusion that
all the other protections of the law accorded to civil populations-the precise

264. See Margulies, supra note 253, at 826 (suggesting such a measure to mitigate harshness
of automatic commitment). See also supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
265. The argument has been made that the rational basis test is inappropriate for reviewing
legislation affecting insanity acquittees, and that the courts should apply strict scrutiny, or at
least intermediate scrutiny, because of the -possible punitive motive behind the legislation and
the status of acquittees as a special class that has historically been subjected and continues to
be subjected to social discrimination. See, e.g., Margulies, supra note 253, at 814-15.
266. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
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criteria for committing them, the explicitness of proof required to show that
these criteria are met, the safeguards and standards of commitment review
procedures (as distinct from release), and the statutorily set limits on the
time of confinement-need not equally be applied to insanity acquittees.
Another basic rationale of Jones explicitly articulated by the Court concerns the reduced risk of dispositional error in cases that have gone the
insanity defense route. The critical concern in civil commitment, according
to the Court, is that a person might be confined for "mere idiosyncratic
behavior, ' 267 behavior that may alarm or anger others but that in and of
itself is not indicative of any clinically recognized mental illness or of real
dangerousness. It is to forestall the possibility of such errors that the law
requires proof that the candidate for civil commitment meets certain specifically defined commitment criteria before authorizing confinement. 26s The
Court's argument in insanity defense cases is that proof that the acquittee
committed a criminal act as a result of mental illness eliminates the risk of
commitment for mere idiosyncratic behavior. It has already been noted that
this argument requires a bit of a leap from the defendant's strategic decision
to plead insanity to the conclusion that the defendant committed the crime,
and the further jump that the finding of criminal insanity permits an inference
of present mental illness and dangerousness. Persons who identify themselves
as patients' advocates or who see their mission as upholding the law's
theoretical purity may not appreciate such legal gymnastics, as they would
brand them, but the message of Jones is that a court that identifies its role
as, among other things, one of upholding the practical workability of the
law or the system, will find the justification it needs in the common sense
assumptions that can be made from the defendant's substantive assertions
and tactical choices that mark the way through the protracted legal machinations that constitute the insanity defense. Critics of Jones have been quick
to find latent desires to punish the acquittee in the subconscious of the
holding's authors and supporters. 269 Additionally, they have attributed to the
proponents of automatic commitment of insanity acquittees an undue affinity

267. Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 367 (1983). Secondary concerns include the
possible stigmatization of persons found to be in need of commitment, but the Court dismissed
this in a footnote saying that, "A criminal defendant who successfully raises the insanity defense
necessarily is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and thus the commitment causes little additional
harm in this respect." Id. at 367 n.16. On the other side stands the societal fear of wrongful
use of the defense by criminals who wish to avoid punishment and who in the bargain may
escape hospital commitment as well. Id. at 364. That concern is a major part of the rationale
behind the automatic commitment statutes which the Court found not unreasonable. Id.
268. By clear and convincing evidence. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
269. See, e.g., Gelwan, Civil Commitment and Commitment of Insanity Acquittees, I I NEW
& Crv. CONFINEMENT 328, 339 (1985); Margulies, supra note 253, at 815-16;
ENo. J. Cm.
Note, Throwing Away the Key: Due Process Rights of Insanity Acquittees in Jones v. United
States, 34 Am. U.L. REv. 479, 515 (1985); Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal,
94 HARv. L. REv. 605, 617-22 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Commitment Following an Insantiy

Acquittal].
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for what is known as the "clean-up" doctrine-the readiness to do whatever
it takes to keep criminals off the streets.2 70 Such ad hominem attacks fail to
acknowledge, however, that the operative calculus in Jones proceeds from a
broader and more defensible perspective.
B.

Other Courts, Other Views

In different jurisdictions, the precise statutory allocation of the burdens
of proof and persuasion between the defendant and the state, the strategic
options available to each, and the substantive criteria to be met in the course
of decision -making at various points in the insanity defense process will
differ, as will the case precedents and social or legal philosophies guiding
the courts in these matters. Thus, Jones-like fact situations in other jurisdictions before other courts need not produce the precise same results as
Jones. Nonetheless, the crux of the Jones holding that insanity acquittees
are a distinct class, not necessarily entitled to the same protections as civil
commitment candidates or populations of related legal status, will have
major effects on the state and federal courts' subsequent assessment of the
statutory law in this area.
1.

The requirement of a special hearing

Three major court cases suggest the impact Jones may have on the basic
issue of "how much process is due" to acquittees when the state decides
whether they should be committed. Chronologically, the first of the three
cases is People v. McQuillan,271 decided by the Michigan Supreme Court
before Jones. The defendant, McQuillan, was tried on charges of assault
with intent to rape and indecent liberties with a minor and was found not
guilty by reason of insanity. He was committed automatically to the state
department of mental health and subsequently confined in Ionia State Hospital. Two years later, through the office of the state appellate defender, he
filed a motion in the original trial court to vacate the commitment order.
Relying on the Specht-Baxstrom line of casess, 272 the trial judge ruled that
Michigan's automatic commitment statute was constitutionally deficient. The
judge then conducted a hearing that accorded the requisite procedural protections and focused on the substantively proper issue of the defendant's
present sanity. Pursuant to this proceeding, the defendant was found sane
and ordered discharged from the department of mental health. The state
appealed, but the Michigan Supreme Court upheld the judgment below in
its essential parts. The McQuillan court found that automatic commitment
of insanity acquittees was permissible for a limited time for purposes of
observation and examination, but that the statute should be constitutionally

270. Note, Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal, supra note 269, at 617.
271. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
272. See supra notes 244 & 245.

1988]

DISPOSITIONAL DECISIONS

construed to imply the requirement of a subsequent full hearing on the
acquittee's present condition, complete with all the essential due process
safeguards accorded to civil populations. 27 3 The court then gave the prosecution twenty days to initiate commitment proceedings against the defendant
on the terms prescribed in the civil court.
The McQuillan result was in part based on the fact that, unlike the law
in the District of Columbia, the burden of persuasion on the issue of insanity
is on the state, which must prove the defendant sane. 274 An acquittal, as the
McQuillan court emphasized, thus establishes only that "the People failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was competent at
the time he committed the crime. '275 A presumption of continuing insanity
from the acquittal verdict is particularly difficult to justify, the court added,
"where there has never been a finding of insanity. '276 Even so, McQuillan's
prescription of automatic but limited observational detention followed by a
mandatory full inquiry into the need for longer term commitment seemed
both to reflect and secure the general direction in which the laws of the
states were moving. A Georgia case, Benham v. Edwards,z2 7 decided nine
years after McQuillan and only a year before Jones, seemed to clinch this
assessment.
In Benham, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
struck down parts of Georgia's insanity defense procedures and prescribed
new ones closely resembling the McQuillan procedures, despite the fact that
the state's existing dispositional provisions accorded greater protection to
the acquittee than Michigan's and the criminal trial findings provided better
evidence of the defendant's insanity. Under the laws of Georgia then in
force, an insanity acquittal meant that the trial court had made an affirmative
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was mentally
incapacitated at the time of the crime. Following such a finding, the trial
court retained jurisdiction over the insanity acquittee and would proceed to
inquire into his present mental state. Based upon a showing of good cause,
the court could then order the acquittee confined in a mental hospital for
not less than thirty days. This was essentially indefinite commitment, as the
law did not require the state to initiate a hearing to determine the need for
continued commitment after the thirty days, but left it up to the acquittee
or the hospital to bring a petition for release. On the basis of these provisions
and their prior interpretation, the court concluded that the Georgia commitment scheme for insanity acquittees in effect raised a conclusive presumption of continuing insanity not applied in civil procedures, in violation
of the equal protection and due process clauses of the federal Constitution.

273. 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
274. MIcH. Comp'. LAws ANN. § 768.20a (Supp. 1986) in the current statutes. See generally
J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 769-77 (Table 12.5, column 9).
275. 392 Mich. 511, 531, 221 N.W.2d 569, 578 (1974).
276. Id.
277. 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
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It went on to hold that the state, after the expiration of the thirty day
evaluation period, must initiate a full-fledged commitment hearing for all
insanity acquittees and carry the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that the acquittee meets the criteria for civil commitment.
It is against the background of cases such as McQuillan and Benham that
the effect of Jones on a Wisconsin case, State v. Field,2 8 must be measured.
In Field, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin relied expressly on Jones, and
reaffirmed the constitutionality of the state's automatic commitment statute
that in 1974 had been held unconstitutional in State ex rel. Kovach v.
Schubert.2 79 Despite Kovach, the automatic commitment law was still on the
books, as the Wisconsin legislature had never acted to repeal or modify its
provisions. The defendant in Field had been committed following what was
essentially a trifurcated criminal trial. During the first phase of the trial he
was found guilty of murder; during the second phase he was adjudged not
guilty by reason of mental disease; and, during the third phase he was found
presently mentally ill and dangerous to others. In this last phase, the state
produced no new evidence but relied solely on the evidence produced in the
first two phases. The defense appealed on the basis that reversible error had
occurred when the trial court ordered commitment in the absence of new
evidence probative of present mental condition. On the basis of Jones,
however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled its earlier Kovach decision
and held that the defendant's commitment could "stand regardless of any
error that might have occurred during the third phase of the trial because
...a third phase . . .is not constitutionally required." 280
It is possible to distinguish Field from McQuillan and Benham by the fact
that the defendant's crime and his insanity were conclusively proved via
Wisconsin's bifurcated trial process, whereas they had to be inferred with
greater or lesser indirection from the original proceedings in Michigan and
Georgia. But the explicit reliance on Jones by the Wisconsin court, and the
reversal of its own McQuillan-Benham-type holding in Kovach, undercut the
significance of that distinction rather decisively. Instead, the lesson from
Field is both more and less than that. It establishes the proposition that
automatic commitment of insanity acquittees is permissible regardless of the
length of the legal leap that must be taken from the criminal trial's prior
findings to the prerequisites for present disposition.
2.

The special evaluation

Litigation on the conduct of special mental evaluations for insanity acquittees has centered on the issues of their legal necessity, on whose initiative
or authority they are conducted, their duration, who should do them, and
the use of the results. The questions put before the courts have been not

278. 118 Wis. 2d 269, 347 N.W.2d 365 (1984).
279. 64 Wis. 2d 612, 219 N.W.2d 341 (1974).
280. 118 Wis. 2d 269, 285, 347 N.W.2d 365, 373 (1984).
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merely questions of statutory interpretation, but more often than not, requests for the courts to fill in the gaps in the states' statutory laws. The
courts have responded with considerable activism, in some cases engaging in
statutory construction in its broadest sense, that is, constructing a statute
where there was none.
As seen in the discussion in the previous section, some courts have not
hesitated to read into the statutes the constitutionally permissible requirement
of a brief commitment for purposes of observation and evaluation where
there is no reference to this concept (McQuillan), or to convert statutory
authorizations for essentially indefinite commitment into more limited evaluatory commitments bounded by judicially drawn time frames (Benham).
Generally, the special diagnostic problems and the public safety concerns
posed by the acquittee population have furnished the rationale for these
ventures in judicial law making, while at the same time rendering them
impervious to constitutional challenge on due process or equal protection
grounds (McQuillan). In terms of any specific case, good cause or some
similar formulation has been the legal rubric supporting the acquittee's
281
commitment for purposes of evaluation.
Where the statutes empower particular agencies or persons other than the
court to move for the acquittee's temporary confinement for evaluation, the
question has arisen whether these powers are exclusive. In line with the case
law involving other situations where the issue of the defendant's mental
condition may intrude, such as the question of the defendant's competency
to stand trial, 2 2 the answer has been that the statutes do not preclude the
28 3
court from ordering the evaluation of an acquittee on its own motion.
Indeed, the general thrust and tenor of cases like McQuillan would suggest
that the court has an obligation to see to it that an insanity acquittee, whose
mental condition is by virtue of the original trial and verdict at issue, receives
a proper mental diagnosis. Jones, of course, repudiated that suggestion when
it held in essence that the acquittee's mental condition can be viewed as
decided by the verdict.
The courts have shown a willingness to set specific evaluation periods in
states where the statutes are silent on the issue, at least for the interim
between the decision and the legislature's next opportunity to act. The
judicially set time frames approximate those in jurisdictions where the leg28 4
islature has spoken.
Similarly, where the issue has been litigated, the courts have followed the
legislative pattern of requiring that the evaluations be performed by mental

281. See, e.g., Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980) (discussed in text

accompanying infra note 297).
282. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
283. See, e.g., In re Lewis, 403 A.2d 1115 (Del. 1979).
284. Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982); In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496
P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980); People
v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
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health professionals. The McQuillan court reasoned that requiring a special
hearing would be meaningless unless trained medical experts had a reasonable
opportunity to observe and examine the acquittee and to report on their
findings.285 More recent case law suggests more particularized entitlements
for the acquittee. In Ohio v. Thomas, 28 6 the court spoke of the right to
independent, court provided examiners, while an arguable extension of the
logic of Ake v. Oklahoma, 2817 a death penalty case, would require courts to
furnish examiners who will "assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation" of the acquittee's side of the case.
Finally, it has been held that court ordered examinations to assess the
acquittee's committability do not violate the right against self-incrimination
because the proceedings are deemed to be civil in nature rather than criminal. 288 The psychiatric assessment is essential to the commitment decision
and it seeks no information and draws no conclusions that would lead to
criminal prosecution.
3.

The commitment criteria and their proof

Under the automatic commitment statutes sustained in Jones, the allegations regarding the crime and the defendant's mental state as proven at the
criminal trial or, better perhaps, the indications regarding present committability that can be inferred from them, are the criteria used to authorize
confinement of the acquittee. In jurisdictions having special procedures for
committing insanity acquittees, the criteria and burdens allocated for proving
them are distinct from those operating at the criminal trial. Benham and
McQuillan, the main cases in this area, prescribed commitment prerequisites
that were identical or substantially similar to those governing civil commitment procedures. Typically, the state must prove dangerousness and mental
illness by clear and convincing evidence. This is, at least, the general picture.
More particular questions of statutory or constitutional interpretation on
these issues have also been litigated. In Harris v. Balone,28 9 a case involving
the constitutionality of Virginia's statutory scheme for committing insanity
acquittees, the court upheld the legislative judgment that a showing that the
acquittee is insane or dangerous suffices as the predicate for commitment,
even though the state's civil commitment criteria required proof of insanity
and dangerousness. Since there had been two separate findings by a panel
of experts that the acquittee was not insane, his commitment was based
solely on his dangerousness, which was proved by a standard equivalent to
preponderance of the evidence, the trial court being "satisfied" by the panel's

285. People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 527-28, 221 N.W.2d 569, 576 (1974) (citing Ragsdale

v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
286. No. 1742 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 20, 1985), 10 MPDLR No. 1, 18.
287. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
288. California v. Beard, 173 Cal. App. 3d 1113, 219 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985).
289. 681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1982).
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finding to this effect. The decision is problematic in a way that goes beyond
the questions traditionally raised about present committability assumptions
drawn from the criminal verdict. The Harris court held rather too blithely
"that it is not a denial of due process for a person who has committed a
criminal act to be incarcerated as long as he is considered dangerous. "' 290
However, one whose laborious defense strategy has been to remain unconvicted cannot be incarcerated. An acquittee may be hospitalized, as the
defendant was in this case, but that disposition requires at the very least an
assumption regarding insanity, an assumption that in general can be made
from the criminal verdict with about as much (or as little) justification as
the assumption of dangerousness, but that was specifically contradicted in
the case at hand. In short, Harris is the sort of case where the decision
makers may have had strong common sense reasons for assuring that the
acquittee be kept off the streets, but where the law, and the law as applied
to the facts, furnished only the weakest grounds for achieving this end.
The facts of the case allowed the Harris court to avoid the question of
whether or not insanity, rather than dangerousness alone, is a sufficient
standard for committing an acquittee. In State v. Krol,291 a 1975 decision
from New Jersey, the court answered this in the negative, asserting that
specific proof of dangerousness to self or others is an essential element for
confinement.
Another question that has come before the courts is whether the criteria
of danger to self or others includes danger to property. In 1984, the Connecticut Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. 292 Additionally, there is
language in Jones regarding the nonequivalence of violent and dangerous
behavior which suggests the same position. 293 But other courts, particularly
294
in the civil commitment context, have come to the opposite conclusion.
295
Finally, in Illinois v. Sanchez,
the court held that the state statute
framing the acquittee's committability in terms of "need of mental health
services on an inpatient basis," coupled with the provisos that he can
"reasonably be expected to inflict physical harm upon himself or others"
and be found to "benefit from inpatient care," delineated sufficient grounds
for commitment even though the court failed to make explicit reference to
"mental illness." The main lesson from this case may be that in the mental
health field big legal battles are sometimes waged on the most trivial of
points.
4.

Procedural rights at the commitment hearing
The extent to which the Jones decision will affect the procedural rights
and safeguards accorded to insanity acquittees in the commitment process

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

Id. at 228.
68 N.J. 236, 344 A.2d 289 (1975).
State v. Lafferty, 192 Conn. 571, 472 A.2d 1275 (1984).
Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365 (1983).
See, e.g., Suzuki v. Yuen, 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
126 Ill. App. 3d 746, 748-49, 467 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (1984).
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can only be inferred from the opinion because those rights were not at issue
in the case. Pre-Jonescases, involving insanity acquittees as well as decisions
on other groups of mentally disabled offenders, generally speak of according,
at a minimum, substantially similar protections to those available in any
proceeding, civil or criminal, where a substantial deprivation of the defendant's liberty is possible. 29 These details were litigated in the Georgia insanity
case of Clark v. State.29 7 The court's holding enumerated the following
procedural entitlements: notice of the right to a hearing; notice of the right
to counsel and appointed counsel in case of indigency; the right to confront
and cross-examine witnesses and to offer evidence; the right to subpoena
any physician on whose evaluation the decision may rest; notice of the right
to be examined by a physician of one's own choosing at one's own expense;
and the right to have appointed a representative or guardian ad litem. This
comprehensive list, of course, would be limited to states where automatic
commitment of acquittees or commitment by so called truncated process is
not the norm.
The acquittee's right to counsel at the commitment proceedings has come
under particular judicial attention in the last few years. 298 The right to legal
assistance after commitment has also been tested. Contrary to their usual
p6sture, but in line with their argument for determinate confinements,
advocates for the acquittees have again resorted to the criminal process
analogy and borrowed from the rights of the convicted and imprisoned.
Thus, in Ward v. Kort,29 the court extended the legal assistance precedents
pertaining to prisoners to patients at Colorado State Hospital who had been
found not guilty by reason of insanity. The fact that Kort in turn has been
successfully used to expand the legal access rights of civil patients a°° illustrates
the circuitous paths along which legal developments are sometimes routed.
5.

Confinement rights and restraints

There exists an elaborate body of both statutory and case law regarding
the treatment and treatment related rights of institutionalized patients, as
well as their right to refuse treatment under certain circumstances. 0 1 There
are also statutes and cases delineating the institution's right to treat and
restrain patients, as well as restraints on the hospital's authority in these

296. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); People v. McQuillan, 392 Mich.
511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974).
297. 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980). See also Schock v. Thomas, 274 Ark. 493, 625
S.W.2d 521 (1981).
298. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979).
299. 762 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1983) (extending access to legal libraries and assistance as
mandated by Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977)). See Appelbaum, The Rising Tide of
Patients' Rights Advocacy, 37 Hosp. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 9 (1986).
300. Coe v. Hughes, No. K-83-4248 (D. Md. April 4, 1985), cited in Appelbaum, supra note
299.
301. See generally J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER, supra note 2, at 327-67.

1988]

DISPOSITIONAL DECISIONS

regards. 0 2 The applicability of this law to insanity acquittees has been
litigated in a number of discrete instances. Many aspects of the question
remain to be answered.
In general, the rights of insanity acquittees vis-a-vis the authority of the
institution are fewer and less potent than those possessed by civil patients.
In Coley v. Clinton,0 3 for example, an Arkansas case decided in 1979, and
one of the small number focusing specifically on insanity acquittees, the
court held that members of this institutionalized population could be subjected to more restraints than civilly committed patients in order to provide
for the physical safety of the other patients, the hospital staff, and the
community. Sometimes insanity acquittees will gain certain rights and privileges only after the state has obtained judicial approval, while other patients
gain the same rights by unchecked administrative decisions. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Killelea,3°4 the court affirmed the statutory proposition that
once an acquittee is committed, the restrictions placed on his movement may
not be lifted unless a court approved their removal. On the other hand, a
court's initiative in imposing restrictions is, at least according to the case of
Warner v. State,0 5 limited to the issues brought before it by the parties. In
Warner, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that the trial court could not
sua sponte prohibit home visits by insanity acquittees confined in state
hospitals.
The most recent case law on the right to treatment and the right to refuse
it for involuntarily committed civil patients pulls in opposite directions. On
the one hand, several major holdings emphasize the patient's autonomy in
selecting and refusing the treatments applied, an autonomy that may be
abrogated only under special circumstances such as a medical emergency or
the patient's formally adjudicated incompetency.3 6 On the other side, stands
a line of cases that reinforces the primacy of professional judgment on these
questions. 3°7 In reviewing issues of treatment and restraints, courts show
considerable deference to decisions made by the treatment provider, the
primary focus of the inquiry being not so much whether the judgment
exercised was right or reasonable, but whether it was in fact a professional
judgment and whether it was made by qualified professionals. While not
directly contradictory, there is an obvious tension between cases stressing
the patient's decision making autonomy and those supporting the prima
facie wisdom of professional judgment. The extent to which either doctrine

302. See generally id. at 251-325.
303. 479 F. Supp. 1036 (E.D. Ark. 1979).
304. 370 Mass. 638, 351 N.E.2d 509 (1976).
305. 309 Minn. 333, 244 N.W.2d 640 (1976).
306. Rennie v. Klein, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915
(N.D. Ohio 1980); Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342 (D. Mass. 1979), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 634 F.2d 650 (1st Cir. 1980).
307. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982); Stensvad v. Reivitz, 601 F. Supp.
128 (W.D. Wis. 1985).
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might apply to treatment decisions involving insanity acquittees is uncertain,
in light of the absence of litigation specifically directed to this issue. If the
law on other issues can be taken as a guide, the special characteristics of
the acquittee population point toward diminished decision making rights for
both acquittee patients and doctors. The presumed dangerousness of this
class suggests a greater societal stake and the need for more judicial supervision over the handling of acquittees during their institutionalization, as
well as before and after it.
6.

Periodic review

Where the statutory law fails to provide for periodic review of the acquittee's condition and need for continued confinement, courts have initiated
such review. Thus, in 1978, the Florida court in Hill v. State 08 imposed on
trial courts the obligation to schedule, "in the exercise of sound discretion,"
full evidentiary hearings for re-examination of acquittees at reasonably separated intervals or upon the suggestion of the providers of treatment and
custody. From a different angle, the court in Government of the Virgin
Islands v. Wallace3°9 held that the commitment of an acquittee under a
statute that was constitutionally defective for failure to require periodic
review was valid, nonetheless, because the court's commitment order required
hospital officials to submit status reports to the court every six months.
7.

Release issues: applications, maximum periods

An insanity acquittee may gain release from confinement after expiration
of the period set by the court's order or the time set by statutory law. In
addition, the acquittee may, at designated intervals, apply for release prior
to the set maximum period of confinement. Some questions, including
constitutional ones, have been litigated in connection with each avenue of
release.
Once the maximum period of confinement has expired, release is not
automatic. The acquittee is at that point entitled, however, to a full hearing
on whether or not there is a need for further confinement. The 1979 D.C.
Circuit decision of Waite v. Jacobs 10 stands for the proposition that the
Constitution requires that the acquittee at this point be treated like any other
civil commitment candidate. Though somewhat fuzzy on the issue-complications involving changes in the law obscure the precise point-the Illinois
case of Lee v. Pavkovic2" seems to reject the constitutional rationale for
such equal treatment of insanity acquittees, but ultimately arrives at the
same result out of "considerations of fairness and substantial justice."

308.
309.
310.
311.

358
679
475
119

So. 2d 190, 208 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
F.2d 1066 (3d Cir. 1982).
F.2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
Ill. App. 3d 439, 447, 456 N.E.2d 621, 627 (1983).
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Although the court in Benham v. Edwards1 2 states that equal protection
principles entitled insanity acquittees to make release applications in the
interim between initial confinement and expiration of the set term with the
same frequency as civil patients, the thrust of the Jones case is to undercut
the requirement of equal treatment at this juncture. Also, the state statutory
law governing acquittees generally contains separate release application provisions from those governing civil patients. The case law other than Benham
that exists on the matter, appears to condone the differences.3"3
8.

Judicial approval of release

The release of civilly committed patients is generally accomplished by
administrative decision alone. The statutory law governing the release of
insanity acquittees, on the other hand, requires a judicial decision, or at
least, judicial approval of the administrative determination. This requirement
has been challenged in the courts on equal protection grounds. Uniformly,
the courts have held that this special treatment of insanity acquittees is
31 4
constitutionally permissible.
The court in Hill v. State and Benham addressed a couple of subissues.
In Hill, the court elaborated on the relevance of administrative decisions,
asserting that if administrative proceedings are held on the acquittee's release,
the court should consider their outcomes and include them in the record. 1 5
In Benham, an equal protection argument was made on behalf of acquittees
charged with crimes indicating dangerousness. Under the laws of Georgia,
their release required judicial approval, whereas the release of other acquittees
and civil patients did not. The court upheld the constitutionality of this class
distinction.316
9.

Release criteria, requisite evidence, and proof

Courts have had to interpret statutory requirements for obtaining the
authorized release of an insanity acquittee and have had to make new law
where the legislature has not acted, at least not with sufficient specificity or
clarity.
Although the law on commitment of acquittees is in accord on the need
to show an acquittee's mental impairment in addition to proving dangerousness, 1 7 the law on release is split on whether dangerousness alone is
sufficient grounds to keep an acquittee institutionalized. Two cases, State v.

312. 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
* 313. Harris v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1982).
314. Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982); Powell v. Florida, 579 F.2d 324 (5th
Cir. 1978); Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Clark v. State, 245 Ga.
629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980).
315. 358 So. 2d 190, 206 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
316. 678 F.2d 511, 536-39 (5th Cir. 1982).
317. But see, Harris v. Ballone, 681 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1982).
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Grebarsky318 and Hill v. State,at 9 suggest that mental disability does not enter
into the determination, and that continued commitment of an insanity
acquittee is authorized solely on proof of continued dangerousness to self
or others. The Hill decision reasoned that the acquittee's mental impairment
was an invalid criterion for determining release so long as the state failed
to take reasonable steps to monitor or assure the acquittee's recovery. 20
Most courts have come to the opposite conclusion. In In re Torsney,3 2, for
example, the court stated that it is constitutionally suspect to keep acquittees
confined on the vague concept of dangerousness unrelated to mental impairment and for which no inpatient treatment is required (or available, it
might have added). The court in State v. Olson 22 was even more emphatic
and asserted that an acquitted rapist's tendency toward antisocial behavior
would not warrant continued hospitalization if he did not suffer also from
a mental disease or defect that caused the behavior. Otherwise, the court
argued, the punishment process of the criminal justice system would be
adequate to handle his future conduct. In a particular twist on the relevance
of the mental impairment criterion, the Walonsky v. Balson3 23 case held that
an acquittee who was restored to sanity through the use of psychotropic
drugs (chemical or synthetic sanity), but whose mental state was dependent
on continued use of such drugs, was not sane within the meaning of the
statute so as to qualify for release. However, cases where the issue is the
defendant's competency to stand trial,3 24 and the dictum of at least one
acquittee release case,3 21 have reached the opposite conclusion on the legal
consequence of drug induced recovery or remission. The ABA Standard
appears to be in line with the latter position in that it proposes that an
acquittee whose sanity is a direct result of the treatment be required to
continue such treatment as a condition of his release. 326
Generally, the case law supports the proposition that the acquittee carries
the burden of proving readiness for release.3 27 One of the few cases out of
line with this position is Benham v. Edwards, 328 where the court held that
as a matter of due process and equal protection, a state could not place the
burden of proving the release criteria on acquittees while simultaneously

318. 90 Wis. 2d 754, 280 N.W.2d 672 (1979).
319. 358 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
320. Id. at 211.
321. 47 N.Y.2d 667, 394 N.E.2d 262, 420 N.Y.S.2d 192 (1979). See also In re Franklin, 7
Cal. 3d 126, 496 P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972).
322. 181 Mont. 323, 336, 593 P.2d 724, 731 (1979).
323. 58 Ohio App. 2d 25, 28, 387 N.E.2d 625, 627 (1976).
324. State v. Hampton, 253 La. 399, 218 So. 2d 311 (1969).
325. State v. Collins, 381 So. 2d 449 (La. 1980).
326. ABA STANDARDS, supra note 9, § 7-7.4(d).
327. Dorsey v. Solomon, 604 F.2d 271 (4th Cir. 1979); In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 496
P.2d 465, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553 (1972); Clark v. State, 245 Ga. 629, 266 S.E.2d 466 (1980). For
statutes, see supra note 165.
328. 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982).
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providing that the government carry the burden in opposing the release of
civil patients. The courts agree that the standard of proof for the acquittee's
release should not be the beyond a reasonable doubt formulation, but the
lesser burdens of clear and convincing evidence 2 9 or simple preponderance
30
of the evidence.1
The type of evidence that is appropriate, and the weight accorded to it,
are also issues that have been litigated. Medical opinion, while relevant to
the question of an insanity acquittee's release, is not necessarily dispositive.
In Application of Noel,33' for example, the court held that commitment and
release decisions are legal decisions rather than medical ones. As such, even
undisputed medical opinion is not conclusive upon the trial court, but must
be weighed with other evidence, such as past conduct and the nature and
seriousness of the crime with which the acquittee was charged. Other cases
such as Hill v. State332 have extolled the importance of lay testimony on the
acquittee's condition and prospects as potentially more weighty and accurate
333
than expert medical opinion on these matters. However, in Warner v. State,
a decision that is at least out of tune with, if not directly contrary to Noel
and Hill, the court held that it was not at liberty to substitute its nonprofessional judgment regarding prognosis for that of medically trained witnesses
who present a different view.
10.

Conditional release issues

The court's authority to grant a conditional release is essentially a matter
of discretion, whereas the decision on absolute discharge is at least in theory
nondiscretionary; when the criteria for discharge are met, the court must
order release, although there is some play, and thus discretion, in deciding
whether the criteria are met. Proof that an acquittee can be safely released
if certain conditions are imposed does not fall within the realm of legal
conclusions that mandate a single, specific legal response. In other words,
it does not generate a requirement that the court must then order the release
and impose the conditions 3 4 However, there may be limits on this discretion.
For example, the appellate court in State v. Collins,335 while conceding the
trial court's discretion in the matter, held that the trial court did not have
unbridled power to disregard uncontested evidence that the acquittee could
have been safely released on supervised probation. The trial court's order

329. Taylor v. Comm'r of Mental Health, 481 A.2d 139, 149 (Me. 1984).
330. In re Franklin, 7 Cal. 3d 126, 141, 496 P.2d 465, 479, 101 Cal. Rptr. 553, 562 (1972);
Hill v. State, 358 So. 2d 190, 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Zion v. Xanthopoulos, 178 Mont.
468, 472, 585 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1978).
331. 226 Kan. 536, 601 P.2d 1152 (1979).
332. 358 So. 2d 190, 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
333. 309 Minn. 333, 339, 244 N.W.2d 640, 644 (1976).
334. See, e.g., Application of Noel, 266 Kan. 536, 601 P.2d 1152 (1979).
335. 381 So. 2d 449 (La. 1980).
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to continue the acquittee's institutionalization in the face of this evidence,
therefore, was vacated.
Restrictions on the type and duration of conditions courts may impose on
acquittees also exist. In Hill v. State,33 the court affirmed the trial court's
power to consider and order conditional release in appropriate cases, adding
that it might in some instances be the best means available to secure evidence
of the acquittee's eligibility for outright release. However, the Hill court
warned that conditional release may not be employed to extend indefinitely
the trial court's hold on acquittees who are ready for absolute release. The
Zion v. Xanthopolous 3a 7 case sustained the trial court's power to require as
a release condition that the acquittee accept psychiatric outpatient care with
supervision, and added that for the purpose of keeping himself properly
informed, the trial judge should require regular reports to the court appointed
probation officer from the treating psychiatrist and the acquittee herself. At
the same time, however, Xanthopolous held improper the imposition on
acquittees of terms designed to regulate the activities of convicted criminals,
such as probation or parole terms. Reasoning that they were punitive in
nature (an arguable proposition), the court invalidated the conditions that
prohibited the acquittee from changing her address without approval of the
parole officer and that required compliance with the existing rules and
regulations of the Department of Institutions' Parole Division.
Revocation proceedings have also come under the scrutiny of appellate
courts. That release can be revoked or conditions modified on the mere
prospect, rather than an actual act of violation of the conditions imposed,
was affirmed in the Washington case of State v. Thompson 3 s The Thompson
court held that evidence showing that the patient was likely to commit
felonious acts jeopardizing public safety in the future was sufficient to
support a decision to revoke his conditional release.
Finally, litigation has affirmed the statutory trend toward notification
requirements in connection with changes in the acquittee's status. In Commonwealth v. Killelea,33 9 for example, the court asserted that the hospital
officials must notify the judge and district attorney having jurisdiction over
the criminal case if the acquittee's discharge is contemplated. In addition,
the court said that the district attorney must be apprised of any hearing
relating to a person committed under court order so as to be able to represent
the public interest at all such proceedings. In In re Anderson, 34° the court
affirmed as a matter of due process the acquittee's right to written notice
of the charges and evidence, and the right to a hearing when revocation is
sought.

336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

358 So. 2d 190 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
178 Mont. 468, 474-76, 585 P.2d 1084, 1087 (1987).
28 Wash. App. 728, 626 P.2d 51 (1981).
370 Mass. 638, 647, 351 N.E.2d 509, 514 (1976).
73 Cal. App. 3d 38, 140 Cal. Rptr. 546 (1977).
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III. THE PROGRAMS

In three states, Illinois, Maryland, and Oregon, there exist special programs
for the post-verdict handling of insanity acquittees that merit close scrutiny
from the legal and psychiatric research communities as well as from law
enforcement personnel, legislative actors and advocates, and other public
policy makers. What makes these programs deserving of such close and
concerted attention is that they are well established, working programs with
a history of experience that is sufficiently long to begin to test the impact
on their targeted populations. Less important is the precise shape of the law
in these three states. The programs are not that closely keyed to the laws,
and some of their main features are not specifically mandated by the law.
In addition, the persons responsible for administering the programs, as well
those who deal with the nitty-gritty of providing the treatment and other
services, tend not to think in terms of the law's finer points, nor are they
even all that familiar with them. The broad outlines of the modern special
acquittee laws are what matter, and in each of the three states include: (1)
provisions emphasizing the option of outpatient treatment immediately after
the verdict or following institutionalization; (2) special evaluation, review,
and monitoring procedures to assure decision making based on better information than has traditionally been available at the commitment, discharge,
and post-discharge stages; (3) judicial authority (or as its substitute, special
authority of a centralized board) over discharge and post-discharge decisions
that traditionally have been solely within the province of local administrative
discretion; and (4) provisions emphasizing the option of conditional discharge, including procedures that can lead to a swift revocation or modification of the conditions when the circumstances call for it. Again, it is the
systematic implementation of these major features of the law that make the
Illinois, Maryland, and Oregon programs uniquely worth examining for their
possible workability in other states, regardless of the smaller statutory differences that may exist. A brief sketch of the key historical, legal, and
operational features of the three programs follows.
A.

The Maryland Program

Having enacted special legislation regarding the disposition of insanity
acquittees as far back as 1967, Maryland appears to have taken the lead in
this field. While there have been some changes in the law and programmatic
operations over the years, the essence of the system has remained fairly
constant. It works as follows. 41 After a verdict of acquittal by reason of
insanity ("not criminally responsible" in today's statutory lexicon), the court
by law must immediately commit the acquittee to the department of mental

341. See MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 12-110 to 12-116 (1979 & Supp. 1984) for the
statutory provisions summarized in this and the next paragraph.
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health for the purpose of inpatient care or treatment. A recently enacted
exception permits the court to instead release the acquittee with or without
conditions, if it has before it a mental evaluation conducted within ninety
days preceding the verdict and indicating that it would be safe and proper
to do so. The State's Attorney must agree. This is presently not an exception
of much practical importance, nor is it likely to be. In the large majority of
cases, the court orders inpatient treatment.
Care and treatment for acquittees is provided at Perkins State Hospital in
Jessup, Maryland, the one facility in the state handling such cases. Although
not prescribed in the statutes, the treatment regimen at Perkins accords
progressively greater measures of freedom and responsibility until the patient
is ready for discharge. What is prescribed is that the gradually increasing
privileges given to the acquittee, as well as other changes in status, must be
reported to the State's Attorney and recorded in a central computerized file
for each committed acquittee. There are various procedures for effecting the
acquittee's discharge. The first opportunity comes by way of a hearing before
a hearing officer within fifty days after the acquittee's commitment. The
hearing officer's report and recommendation are subject to judicial review
in a full hearing, unless waived by the party adversely affected. Release may
be absolute or conditional. If the acquittee remains institutionalized, he may
apply for release via standard administrative or judicial dicharge proceedings
no earlier than a year after the initial mandatory hearing. Again, the options
at this point are continued commitment, conditional discharge, or absolute
discharge. Both in concept and practice, the crux of the legislative scheme
is centered in the provision authorizing the hospital authorities to apply "at
any time" for the patient's conditional release, the classic requirement being
outpatient treatment for a period of up to five years. Such mandatory
outpatient treatment assignments, which must be approved by the court and
communicated to the State's Attorney, coupled with special provisions for
revoking the release or changing its conditions (with similar judicial and
prosecutorial involvement), permit the hospital authorities to closely monitor
and control the acquittee's readjustment to life in the free community via
supervision implemented in a half-way house in Baltimore. All along the
acquittee's route toward reintegration into the community, the public's safety
interest is thus represented by the possibility of prosecutorial intervention
and the judicial check on administrative decisions.
As in virtually all jurisdictions, the number of insanity acquittees in
Maryland is small. This hampers research on the critical questions regarding
3 42
program success. The most recent figures, made public in a 1984 study,
counted only ninety-one individuals discharged from the program over the
last nine years. Indeed, the number of insanity acquittees is small nationally, 4 a fact that stands in contrast to the preponderant philosophic signif-

342. Spodak, Silver & Wright, Criminality of Discharged Insanity Acquittees: Fifteen Year
Experience in Maryland Reviewed, 12 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 373 (1984).
343. See supra note 1.
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icance of the insanity defense in the administration of criminal justice and
in the literature on the criminal justice process.
B.

The Illinois Program

Illinois adopted legislation similar to Maryland's in 1978.74 A defendant
found not guilty by reason of insanity must undergo an evaluation by the
Department of Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities. In proper
instances this may be conducted on an outpatient basis. If found to be
subject to involuntary admission or in need of mental health services, the
defendant is placed in a secure facility, unless the court finds compelling
reasons that such security is not necessary. Once confined, the Illinos acquittee's legal rights and liabilities attendant to release and post-release lifeits possible conditions, including continued treatment requirements, the possible revocation or modification of these conditions, notification, reporting,
and other monitoring requirements-are sufficiently similar to those of a
Maryland acquittee so that a separate description is unnecessary.
In Illinois's acquittee program, the central functions pertaining to postrelease outpatient treatment and monitoring are performed by staff of the
Isaac Ray Center, a psychiatric services branch of the Rush-Presbyterian-St.
Luke's Medical Center in Chicago. The Isaac Ray Center provides mental
health services not only to persons acquitted by reason of insanity, but also
to mentally disordered offenders of various other legal statuses. All patients
seen at the Center are there by court order that, among other things, requires
them to follow the rules and regulations of the Center or be subject to court
imposed sanctions. Each patient is given an initial evaluation to determine
general suitability for treatment and, specifically, the likelihood of benefit
from the program, including need for medication or specialized treatment
for drug or alcohol problems. If accepted into the Center's program, the
patient is assigned to a primary therapist. During the early course of treatment, most patients come in for treatment at least once a week. Roughly
60% of the patients, on the average, are on psychotropic medications
3 45
prescribed by the Center's psychiatric staff.
Unlike Maryland's, the Illinois acquittee program does not operate its own
half-way house. Instead, the patients are scattered in various community
based living situations. The movement and behavior of the patients are,
however, closely monitored. In the course of treatment, Isaac Ray staff
usually maintain an ongoing consulting relationship with the patient's family
and attorney, the committing judge, and the probation officer. If there are
signals that a patient's mental state is deteriorating, or if there is evidence
of a violation of release conditions, the staff has the power to intervene
immediately, including the authority to move for recommitment.

344. See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, para. 1005-2-4 (1985).
345. The information on the Illinois program in this paragraph was supplied to the author
directly by the Isaac Ray staff.
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A small acquittee population characterizes Illinois as it does Maryland,
with similar consequences for quantitatively meaningful research on this
population. The research problems in Illinois are further exacerbated by the
fact that the Isaac Ray program is selective since not all, nor even a random
portion, of the state's acquittees receive its ministrations. A study published
in 1985146 on the improvement and adjustment of Isaac Ray's acquittee
population measured success rates on these items for forty-four acquittees,
reported to be "approximately 85 percent of all NGRI acquittees discharged
into the community [at that time] in the Cook County area, as estimated by
the state director of forensic services." More will be said about the nature
and effects of this selectivity in the next section.
C.

The Oregon Program

Oregon also enacted special insanity acquittee legislation in 1978.1 47 Its
primary distinguishing feature is the creation of what is called the Psychiatric
Security Review Board (PSRB), which consists of a lawyer, a psychiatrist,
a psychologist, a parole or probation expert, and a member of the general
public. It is independent of both the court and the state's mental health
department. Subsequent to an insanity acquittal ("guilty except for insanity"
is the phraseology devised by the Oregon legislature to send a message of
assurance to the public and warning to any potentially manipulative defendant), the trial judge decides whether the acquittee continues tO be mentally
ill and dangerous. If yes, the judge places the acquittee under the jurisdiction
of the PSRB, which then assumes sole authority over the acquittee's fate.
The PSRB decides whether and when to institutionalize or release the acquittee. It may impose a wide range of conditions authorized by the law.
PSRB jurisdiction expires absolutely at the termination of the maximum
criminal sentence that could have been exacted had there been a full conviction. Outpatient treatment mandated as a condition of release may be
provided at any of a number of treatment clinics throughout the state.
Together with modification and summary revocation procedures, the latter
permitting rehospitalization without a full PSRB hearing for twenty days,
the outpatient treatment option lies at the heart of the Oregon system for
managing its acquittee population.
In many respects then, the Oregon scheme resembles the schemes prescribed
in the statutes of Maryland and Illinois, except that the oversight and
monitoring responsibilities of the court and the mental health department
have been delegated to a special administrative review board. This is no
minor innovation conceptually. Whether it has major practical impact can
only be determined by the empirical data. A large amount of data has
already been developed and analyzed in Oregon, the state of the research

346. Cavanaugh & Wasyliw, Treating the Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity Outpatient: A
Two-Year Study, 13 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW 407, 410 (1985).
347. See OR. REV. STAT. § 161.290 (1984).
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there being considerably farther advanced than it is in the other two model
jurisdictions. Apart from its range, another advantage of the empirical
information already available in Oregon is that it is based on significantly
larger population samples than is the case in Maryland and Illinois. Because
in Oregon, some
of higher commitment rates and better tracking procedures
348
of the analyses involve as many as 630 acquittees.
IV.

PRESENT FINDINGS AND

FUTuRE

RESEARCH

An examination of the available data and findings on the programs is
useful for two reasons: (1) it tells us what is known about the post-verdict
treatment of insanity acquittees; and (2) it tells us what is not known, and
what the gaps or flaws are in the available information and how we might
go about remedying these deficiencies. It is best to do this examination state
by state, as each experience yields its own unique set of findings and
limitations on these findings.
Before going into this state-by-state examination, it would help to spell
out with precision what the objectives of the programs are and thus what
the aims (or hypotheses, if you will) of the existing studies or any future
research on the subject should be. This is particularly important in view of
the fact that the aims of both the programs, and the prior studies in general,
have not been very clearly articulated. Articulated or not, there is an implicit
assumption in each of the programs, and in the laws that stand behind and
guide their operation, that insanity acquittees who come within their ambit

348. See Rogers, Bloom & Manson, Oregon's New Insanity Defense System: A Review of
the First Five Years, 1978 to 1982 (1984) [hereinafter Oregon's New Insanity Defense System].
This unpublished paper from the Department of Psychiatry, Oregon Health Sciences University,
provides a handy summary of the research done to date on the Oregon program and has been
published in a variety of law and psychiatry journals. See also Bloom & Bloom, Disposition
of Insanity Defense Cases in Oregon, 9 BULL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW No. 2 (1981);
Bloom, Faulkner, Shore & Rogers, The Young Adult Chronic Patient and the Legal System:
A Systems Analysis, 19 HEALTH SERVICES 37 (1983); Bloom, Rogers & Manson, After Oregon's
Insanity Defense: A Comparison of Conditional Release and Hospitalization, 5 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 391 (1982); Rogers, 1981 Oregon Legislation Relating to the Insanity Defense and
the Psychiatric Security Review Board, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 23 (1982); Rogers & Bloom,
Characteristicsof Persons Committed to Oregon'sPsychiatric Security Review Board, 10 BULL.
Am. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & LAW No. 3 (1982); Rogers & Bloom, The Insanity Sentence: Oregon's
PsychiatricSecurity Review Board, 3 BERAV. Sci. & LAW 69 (1985). Rogers, Bloom & Manson,

Oregon'sInnovative System for Supervising Offenders Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity,
33 Hosp. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 1022 (1982); Rogers, Bloom & Manson, State's InsanityDefense:
An Alternate Form of Sentence, OR. ST. BAR BULL. 4 (July 1982); Rogers, Bloom & Manson,

Insanity Defenses: Contested or Conceded?, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 885 (1984); Rogers, Sack,
Bloom & Manson, Women in Oregon's Insanity Defense System, 11 J. PSYCHIATRY & LAW
515 (1983); Rogers, Bloom & Manson, Oregon's Psychiatric Security Review Board: A Comprehensive System for Managing Insanity Acquittees (1984) (unpublished monograph, Oregon
Health Sciences University); Bloom, Rogers, Manson & Williams, Lifetime Police Contacts of
DischargedPsychiatricSecurity Review Board Clients (unpublished monograph, Oregon Health
Sciences University).
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will do appreciably better than untreated acquittees, who have not had the
benefit of the post-hospital treatment and monitoring that constitutes the
essence of the special programs. Improvement is expected in the following
respects: (1) incidence of criminal recidivism; (2) psychological and community functioning; and (3) economics of treatment and rehabilitation.
Ultimately, there is an elemental logic in the assumption that programs
combining sustained treatment, monitoring, and recommitment capabilities
over insanity acquittees will accomplish certain public safety and rehabilitative objectives that are foregone when nothing sustained or systematic is
done after the verdict. The point of research, however, is to prove this
assumption and to ask at what costs the accomplishments come. Only then
will it be possible to determine whether these programs are worthwhile,
efficient, and effective compared to other or no approaches, and whether
they are worthy of replication in other jurisdictions, and perhaps of application to other offender populations.
A.

Results of the Maryland Program

There have been two studies of the Maryland program. One is unpublished
and will not be reviewed here,3 49 although some of its findings appear in the
published study. The published work by Spodak, Silver and Wright35 ° is
concerned strictly with criminal recidivism or, as the authors put it, with
"the arrests, convictions, and incarcerations of a large cohort of insanity
acquittees in Maryland over a fifteen-year period after discharge from the
hospital.""'' An elucidation of one of the three prime measures of success
of the program would have been quite valuable. The study, however, contains
a number of methodological and analytical shortcomings that limit its usefulness.
One of the problems is that the precise composition of the study's cohort
never becomes clear. It totals eighty-six persons, hardly a large group. 5 2 In
fact, the article contains at least three different descriptions of the group's
make-up. In the opening page, the targeted population is given as the "men
'
adjudicated NGBRI of violent offenses." 353
A few pages later it is "virtually
'3 4
all men who are adjudicated NGBRI after felony charges in Maryland.
Three pages further, the cohort is defined as "all the men found NGBRI in
connection with felony charges in Maryland between mid-1967 and mid1976."131 The authors fail to provide a consistent description, much less an

349. Madden, Clifton T. Perkins Outcome Study: A Review of 65 Patients Presently on Five
Year Convalescent Leave (1978) (unpublished paper, Clifton T. Perkins Hospital).
350. See Spodak, Silver & Wright, supra note 342.
351. Id. at 373.
352. Actually, the cohort contained ninety-one patients, but "no data was discoverable in
reference to five patients." Id. at 375.
353. Id. at 373.
354. Id. at 375.
355. Id. at 378.
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explanation, of this selectivity in the program. As a result, we do not learn
with any degree of precision how the program population differs from the
general criminal population or from all other insanity acquittees. Such
information, however, is absolutely crucial to the ability to make comparative
statements about criminal recidivism and program success. Different criminal
populations have different recidivism rates. To the extent that we are kept
in the dark about the precise characteristics of the population studied, we
do not know what level of recidivism to expect, we cannot account for the
background differences so as to enable us to make valid comparisons among
comparable populations which is a problem in any event given the small
total numbers, and we cannot ascribe differences in the actual recidivism
rates to the ministrations of the program.
Even if we put aside this basic methodological problem, there are other
difficulties with the findings presented by the study and the conclusions
drawn from these findings. Perhaps in recognition of the precarious validity
of the external comparisons made, the study pins a good portion of its hope
for meaning on internal comparisons and on a presentation of facts and
figures that presumably speak for themselves. For example, the article seeks
to derive much of its mileage from the finding that the "entire cohort shows
substantially fewer arrests as well as other indicators of criminality, such as
charges and convictions than are reported prior to the original admission. ' 356
However, absent a comparison with untreated or unmonitored acquittees,
there is no support for the implication that this is a measure of program
success.357 The decreased rates could be a result of institutionalization, rather
than the post-institutional treatment that is the essence of the program.
Alternatively, it could simply be the aging of the acquittees, a factor associated with a reduction of criminal propensities of offender populations in
general.
As for the other results reported, much of their meaning depends on what
one likes to see, and thus, prefers to emphasize. One of the main findings
is that forty-eight of the eighty-six acquittees (5607o) were arrested at least
once during the five to fifteen years subsequent to their discharge. 358 To put
this in context, the study makes a general reference to research done by
Pasewark, Pantle and Steadman showing "comparability of outcome between
exconvicts and exacquittees.'

' 59

Not only is the relevance of this finding

356. Id. at 375.
357. The implication is made explicit in the final pages of the paper:
[The acquittees] were arrested 2.5 times less frequently after their insanity acquittal
as a group, and in 44 percent of cases their arrest rate became zero. It is likely this

experience is a direct result not only of their hospital treatment but also of the fiveyear conditional release program described herein and possibly the halfway house
program ....
Id. at 380.
358. Id. at 375.
359. Id. at 380 (citing Pasewark, Pantle & Steadman, Detention and Rearrest Rates of
Persons Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity and Convicted Felons, 139 AM. J. PsYCHIATRY
892 (1982)).
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unclear, but the actual figures in the latter study-24%0 rearrests for the
acquittees and 27% for the convicted felons 36-hardly shed a favorable light
on the performance of the Maryland program.
In the absolute, a rearrest rate of over 50% is not supportive of claims
of program success. To the general public, and perhaps to the conscientious
policy maker as well, this information is likely to come across as clear
evidence of this population's continuing dangerousness. The study attempts
to minimize this message3 61 by emphasizing that of the forty-eight acquittees
arrested, only twenty-six were ultimately convicted and only eleven reincarcerated, and that in most cases "the subsequent convictions were for less
serious offenses with less potential for physical harm than the original offense
resulting in insanity acquittal."M36 It then goes on to conclude that "insanity
acquittees as a group do not present a substantial danger to public safety
when discharged from the hospital" and that "a five-year frame for supervised aftercare appears to cover the period of greatest risk for criminal
recidivism in this population. ' 3 3 This conclusion is seriously undercut, if
not belied, by the study's own data showing that as much as 41% of the
recidivism occurred after the first five years, 39% during years six to ten,
and 2% between the eleventh and fifteenth years. 364
Much as one would like these acquittee programs to be successful, the
problem with the Maryland study is that it has not mustered the evidence
to support a positive conclusion. It presents no comparative information
that would enable us to trace the results to the program itself. Indeed, the
absolute figures that suggest to the study's authors that the acquittees pose
no substantial safety risks may suggest to the general public exactly the
opposite. Subjective evaluations are of course not susceptible to proof. The
mission of objective research, however, is to furnish facts that have the
power to influence subjective opinion, while the task of the responsible, if
inevitably subjective, researcher is to order and interpret the facts in a way
that maximizes their impact on public opinion. So far the work done on the
Maryland program falls short in both regards.
B. Results of the Illinois Program
The Illinois study, by Cavanaugh and Wasyliw, 365 focuses primarily on the
psychological improvements of insanity acquittees who have gone through

360. Also the number of persons in the Pasewark study is thirty-seven acquittees and the
same number of convicted felons, which is so small as to make percentage comparisons close
to meaningless.
361. This posture comports with the usual academic perspective. See, e.g., T. THORNBERRY
& J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: A COMMUNtTY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS

(1979), as well as a critique of that book in Brakel, Sampling the Mental Health Law Literature:
Three Recent Books, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 535.
362. Spodak, Silver & Wright, supra note 342, at 376.
363. Id. at 382.
364. Id. at 377 (graph).
365. See Cavanaugh & Wasyliw, supra note 346.
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the program, though it also contains some impressionistic evidence and a
conclusion on criminal recidivism. The sampling problems of the research,
as in the case of the Maryland study, are quite serious. The cohort here is
a mere forty-four acquittees whose post-discharge progress was followed for
only two years. The small size of the sample renders a discriminating analysis
virtually impossible. In addition, two years of relative freedom for acquittees
is insufficient time to make reliable measurements on recidivism, which other
studies'" have shown to peak in later years, and presumably, it is also too
short to assess psychological functioning.
Whether the sample is representative either of other offender populations
or other insanity acquittees is problematic and makes it extremely hazardous
to generalize findings from the study. As mentioned earlier, this study covered
"approximately 8507o of the acquittees discharged into the community in the
Cook County area." '36' We do know in this case something about the selection
process, the requirements for entry into the program, and the characteristics
3 68
that dictate exclusion. As the researchers report, the acceptance criteria
were: (1) presence of a major mental disorder, whether symptomatic or in
remission; (2) existence of community supports (family, financial, housing,
occupational, etc.); and (3) agreement by the patient as to the requirements
of the program, including full understanding of possible legal sanctions for
noncompliance. The primary exclusion criteria were: (1)continued neea of
intensive inpatient care; and (2) a primary diagnosis of antisocial personality
or drug abuse disorder. In addition, the study reports that a full 80% of
the acquittee subjects in the sample were charged with murder or attempted
murder.36 9 Whether this was a result of the selection process is not clarified.
On the one hand, this clearly makes the sample unrepresentative as compared
to other acquittee populations, let alone the general offender population.
This has fundamental implications regarding the recidivism potential and
other predictors of behavior of treated acquittees versus those of any random
sample of untreated acquittees or offenders. On the other hand, once we
know the bias as to criminal charge in the sample, theoretically we can
control for it in any comparisons we attempt. Whether this was practically
feasible is a matter of speculation and the study did not control for this
bias.
What the study did do is present in some detail the results of a series of
standardized tests of psychological and community functioning administered
to the acquittees in the program. These showed general, statistically significant improvements over time for most subjects. The absence of data on an
untreated control group makes it impossible to trace the improvements to
the program. While it may be reasonable to assume a connection, such an
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assumption is no substitute for data in combatting counter-assumptions, such
as the assumption that passage of time is the primary explanation in the
case of reductions in criminal recidivism rates generally.
The study also reports the happy fact that during its two years "no arrests
for violent crime or other crimes against persons occurred. "370 This finding
is contrasted with "existing studies of NGRI acquittees discharged into the
community, but not followed on an outpatient basis, which have shown
rearrests for the first three years following discharge, ranging from 15 to 37
percent."'371 In reality, the work cited for these findings reports on five
different studies following radically varying acquittee populations for periods
ranging from two to seven years whose recidivism rates varied from 5% to
65%, results that demonstrate the primitive stage of research in this area,
but not much else. Finally, the Illinois experience showed a 25% rehospitalization rate for those in the program, and program success in terms of
limiting confinement is thus ambiguous.
The study concludes that "a carefully administered and closely supervised
outpatient treatment program for NGRI patients may be a viable and
preferable alternative either to prolonged institutionalization or to unconditional, unsupervised discharge.' '372 One can hardly disagree with this.
Unfortunately, it remains essentially an article of faith. The study does not
provide convincing proof. No policy maker charged with the responsibility
of deciding whether scarce public funds should be allocated to the initiation
or perpetuation of a program of this kind could afford to base a decision
on such slim and impeachable evidence.
C. Results of the Oregon Program
As mentioned, the Oregon program has been studied more extensively
than either the Illinois or Maryland experience. All of the Oregon studies
have been done by the team of Bloom and Rogers, and one or two additional
researchers.3 73 If there is a drawback to this sustained team effort, it is that
both Bloom and Rogers have had continuing direct professional involvements
with the general evaluation and disposition of Oregon's insanity acquittees
and with the workings of the PSRB in particular. It may be argued, however,
that what is lost in objectivity may be offset by the benefits of the researchers'
intimate acquaintance with the system. This inside knowledge gives them a
very large advantage over outside researchers who must educate themselves,
may never fully learn about the system's finer points, and may spend so
much time and energy in learning the operational basics that the ultimate
analysis of the program results does not get its due. Also, the major

370. Id. at 411.
371. Id. at 413 (citing Pasewark, Insanity Plea: A Review of the Research Literature, 9 J.
357 (1981)).
372. Cavanaugh & Wasyliw, supra note 346, at 415.
373. See supra note 348 for citations to the studies.
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advantages that flow from a continuous research effort, as opposed to
sporadic forays by different researchers, are not to be minimized.
The Bloom and Rogers studies 7 4 have addressed a series of issues, some
more directly on point than others to the focus of this paper. They present
data and analysis on the defendants' success in using the insanity defense,
including how many raise it and are found not responsible (since changed
to "guilty except for insanity"), what the trial proceedings are like in
successful cases, whether lack of capacity to appreciate criminality or the
alternative prong, to conform conduct to the law, is responsible for the
results, and the role of juries in the process. Of more direct concern here
are a second series of findings concerning acquittees. These findings include:
how many are placed under PSRB jurisdiction; what kinds of crimes they
committed; how many are conditionally released and when; how many are
not released and where they are placed; the diagnostic profile of those under
PSRB jurisdiction; how many conditionally released acquittees commit new
crimes; how many of the absolutely released (and not under PSRB jurisdiction) recidivate; how many PSRB acquittees escape from the hospital; the
average time acquittees spend under PSRB jurisdiction; how often release
conditions are revoked; and the costs of the program.
Despite the development of this considerable and valuable body of data,
it nonetheless falls short of comparative, generalizable meaning in a number
of critical respects. The information is not the kind that would permit
confident policy making about the general post-verdict treatment of insanity
acquittees. Some of this is due to the particularity of the Oregon program,
some is due to the data's limits, and the rest is attributable to the paucity
of comparative information from other jurisdictions. Through no fault of
those who administer or have studied the Oregon program, the relevance of
its results suffers from the unavailability of a solid frame of reference. The
remainder of this section concentrates on the specifics that make this so.
One of the outstanding characteristics of Oregon's acquittee population is
the relatively low percentage who have committed the most serious of
offenses, such as murder and attempted murder which are crimes that
constitute far larger, sometimes predominant, proportions of acquittee populations in other jurisdictions. It also includes a substantial number of
comparatively nonserious offenders, including misdemeanants, who would
in many other states be wholly absent. The proportion of Oregon acquittees
under PSRB jurisdiction charged with murder and attempted murder is 10%,
and it is only 5% when those acquitted prior to formation of the PSRB,
but post-facto included, are dropped from the count. 7 5 One will recall that
the proportion of such offenders in Illinois was 80% .376 This enormous

374. The discussion in the next few pages draws primarily from Oregon's New Insanity
Defense System, supra note 348.
375. Id. at 8 & Table 3 app.
376. Cavanaugh & Wasyliw, supra note 346. See also J. BRAKEL, J. PARRY & B. WEINER,
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difference renders impossible any gross comparison of recidivism rates and
other critical indicators of program efficacy between Oregon and Illinois, or
for that matter between Oregon and any other more typical state. It may be
possible to reanalyze the data by selecting offenders by type of crime, but
among the difficulties one then runs into is that the numbers become too
small to permit meaningful, discriminating conclusions. Similar problems
with gross and more selective comparisons are caused by imbalances at the
nonserious end of the crime scale because some 25016 of the Oregon acquittees
are misdemeanants,3 77 whereas in other states the proportion of such offenders ranges from small fractions to none.
The studies report that during the five years between the inception of the
PSRB process and the conclusion of the research, 295 of the total of 630
acquittees (47o) were granted conditional release.3 78 A good portion of the
research focuses on how this population fared in the community. One finding
is that thirty-nine (13%) were charged with new crimes. 79 The prior crimes
of these recidivists are presented, but no information is made available on
how long they were out on release, which is a critical omission if the object
is to compare the rate with that of other released acquittee populations. Of
the total charged with new crimes, twenty-one (7%) were charged with
misdemeanors, eighteen (607o) with felonies, fifteen (5076) were convicted,
fourteen (50%o) had their charges dismissed, and five (1.707o) again were found
not responsible (NGRI) s0 An additional fifteen acquittees under PSRB
jurisdiction, but not out on release, were charged with crimes, and ten of
these were felonies. Of this group, nine were so called unauthorized absences
(walk-outs, escapes), three committed the crime while in the hospital, two
were out on temporary passes, and one was on parole."' 1 Unauthorized
absences are a program problem irrespective of whether they lead to new
crimes. Reports that "until recently almost every month a number of people
escaped by walking away, though usually not from the maximum security
wards ' '38 2 indicate that the Oregon approach is no foolproof remedy for this
problem.

supra note 2, at 708 n. 190. The note cites a variety of studies from different jurisdictions giving
type-of-crime statistics for insanity acquittees. A murder/attempted murder rate of around 50%
seems to approximate the norm (assuming any norms can be inferred from such few and
methodologically disparate pieces of research). A recent summary article by Steadman, Insanity
Defense Research and Treatment of Insanity Acquittees, 3 BEI-AV. Sm. & LAw 37, 39 (1985),
confirms this pattern for Michigan and New York, with murder/attempted murder rates of
57%o and 51% for their insanity acquittees respectively, but also shows that in some other
states, serious offenses do not dominate as much, e.g., murder rates (not including attempts)
of 28%, 26%, and 5% in the acquittee populations of Connecticut, New Jersey, and Missouri
respectively.
377. Oregon's New Insanity Defense System, supra note 348, at 7 & Table 4.
378. Id. at 12.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 13.
382. Id.
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Another critical gap in the data is that no systematic information has been
collected on the 313 of the 630 acquittees who were given a full discharge
383
from the hospital and the PSRB during the period covered by the study.
Recidivism and other rates on this group could provide a very useful context
for assessing the meaning of the results for the conditionally released acquittees. As it is, all one is given is that there were eight suicides among the
full discharges within the period covered and two more within a year after
this period, 38 4 a disconcerting fact, but one whose comparative significance
remains unknown.
Information on the number of revocations of release remains incomplete,
despite the fact that the studies' authors presumably perceive it as critical
to their discussion of "how effective the community treatment programs
are.''385 The reports assert that "initial indicators are that a high percentage
of those on conditional release are revoked by the PSRB but that few of
those revocations result from new criminal charges. "386 The authors then
conclude that "[t]his suggests that the conditional release program is working
effectively to monitor and intervene promptly so as to prevent recidivism.' '387
These are somewhat puzzling observations for a number of reasons. Presumably, every acquittee charged with a new crime is revoked. Moreover, the
13% so charged is not a negligible proportion per se. Nor is it negligible in
comparison to recidivism rates cited in other studies 388 for other criminal
offender populations. Nor, in the absence of internal program comparisons
that might have been possible, does it appear that the authors are justified
in reaching this positive conclusion. As in the case of the Illinois and
Maryland studies, the good news from Oregon remains in the realm of
assertions of faith, beliefs that one may share or hope to be able to prove,
but that so far remain unproved.
Cost data presented by the Oregon studies 389 are rough, but of considerable
interest. They would be even more valuable if similar data were available
for the other acquittee programs and for confined and unconfined acquittee
populations not monitored by such special programs. There are two separable
overt cost components budgeted for the Oregon program: the costs of
operating the PSRB (fees, per diem reimbursements, office space, and clinical
assistance for the Board members), which come to $145,000 per year; and
the costs of community treatment for the acquittees, which are $323,500
annually. The latter figure is reported to cover regular treatment services for
some sixty to sixty-five acquittees at $3100 per client, plus another sixteen
especially troublesome clients in intensive slots at unspecified increased costs.
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Of course, missing from these computations are a number of other cost
factors that have not been, but might well be, counted as among the
economies or diseconomies of the program. Criminal justice processing costs
for the recidivist acquittees and rehospitalization costs for those who do not
make it psychiatrically once released are two of the more obvious factors,
although difficult to assess with precision.
D. Future Research
The directions for future research are to a large extent implied in the
exposition and critiques of the research done so far. A brief discussion,
much of it in the nature of a recapitulation, will suffice.
1. Characteristics of the acquittee populations studied
A major obstacle to the conduct of valid, generalizable research on the
special acquittee programs is the selectivity of the population that comes
within each program's ambit. The characteristics of the treated acquittees
vary from program to program, as well as from untreated acquittee populations and from nonacquittee offenders with recognized mental problems.
This precludes gross comparisons of the effects of the programs upon the
behavior of the various populations. Any future research should carefully
delineate the selection criteria of the programs and spell out their effect on
the critical characteristics of the subject population. Once this is done, it
may be possible to group the subjects in such a way as to permit comparisons.
The size of the populations studied must be large enough to permit statistically significant analysis. Given the relatively small numbers of persons
who annually enter or leave the programs, it is probably necessary to extend
the study to several years of operation. The full effects, if any, of the
programs are not measurable until several years after the acquittees have
been discharged.
2.

The meaning of the results

Agreement on the primary criteria for measuring the efficacy of the
programs does not automatically guarantee agreement on the meaning of
the findings. Even if the comparability problem has been solved, there will
remain fundamental problems about the proper interpretation of the psychological, recidivism, and cost results.
It must be recognized at the outset that as a practical matter, data on the
psychological improvement or community adjustment of treated acquittees
will not suffice to persuade policy makers to support special acquittee
programs. Among the reasons are that subject recidivism and program costs,
the two other prime criteria on program efficacy, are given overriding
importance. This priority assessment is no doubt partly based on the notion
that hard information (dollar costs and numbers of arrests, charges, or
convictions) is the best predicate for making hard policy decisions. There is
also the complementary view that the specific types of psychological data
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developed in research on the programs are not sufficiently reliable. Finally,
many policy makers share a more general skepticism about the psychiatric
disciplines, which moves them to discount the weight of even the firmer
findings. The result is that even with definitive evidence that the programs
could produce measurable psychological benefits for the subjects treated, the
political support will not be forthcoming unless these benefits are matched
by corresponding reductions in the subjects' recidivism and the assurance
that the benefits can be achieved at politically affordable costs.
Interpreting changes in the criminal recidivism rates is subject to a number
of caveats. Though elementary, the error of comparing different measures
of recidivism (e.g., arrests or charges versus convictions) has not always been
avoided in the prior studies. Occasionally the problem has been compounded
by the researchers' disregard for how long the acquittees have been out in
the community. Plenty of difficulties remain once these variables are properly
accounted for. Must length of institutionalization prior to release be considered? Should the research take account of varying release conditions? Once
full release is achieved, must the subjects be dropped from the cohort for
purposes of research? Do they comprise a separate cohort against which the
conduct of the conditionally released subjects can profitably be measured?
Also, the researcher should at all times keep in mind that criminal charges,
convictions, and even arrest rates are only imperfect measures of the actual
incidence of recidivist conduct.
There are other interpretive pitfalls into which researchers have stumbled.
A major one is the notion that there is agreement on the significance of the
rates in the absolute. Academics often write glowingly that only 15% to
25% of a given monitored population has gone back to crime. 39 It is unlikely
that the general public or publicly accountable decision makers share this
interpretive bias. In the public's estimation, 15% to 25% may be way too
high and an indication that the programs are not succeeding, that release
conditions are too lax, or that release is premature. These interpretive biases
may be difficult to resolve, but the researcher should at least show an
appreciation of their existence. Subjective conclusions about recidivism written from the pristine perspective where any rate less than 100% is hailed as
a positive accomplishment are not salable to the public and ultimately detract
from the credibility of findings for which there is firm, objective support.
Findings that criminal activity among a particular treated population is
reduced relative to that population's behavior prior to treatment, either
quantitatively or in the level of seriousness of the crimes, should be approached with the greatest caution. Such reductions are universal among
offender populations and in large measure are attributable to the mere
passage of time, in other words, the aging of the subjects, whether institutionalized, treated, or not. If not insurmountable, the difficulty of separating
possible treatment effects from the general impact of time passed inside or

390. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
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outside an institution may make it inefficient to even try. It would, among
other things, involve a strictly controlled comparison procedure with an
untreated group, which once set up may render the before-and-after analysis
inessential. The more fruitful procedure then would be the simpler and more
direct focus on the after-treatment results, only as between the treated and
untreated groups. It is in this comparison that the pay-off of research lies.
If it is possible to do it properly, despite all the real-world contaminations
that hinder the effort, then the research results deserve serious attention
from those who have the power to make or break the treatment programs
in question.
Recidivism is sometimes also measured in the numbers of revocations or
rehospitalizations among the treated subjects. While such information is
qualitatively useful to describe program intervention patterns and procedures,
it is unwise to try to interpret it quantitatively for the purpose of making
direct statements, or even mere suggestions, about program success. On the
one hand, the programs aim to maximize interventions in the effort to
prevent regression to crime or psychiatric breakdown. From that perspective,
revocations and rehospitalizations are a positive indicator of program performance, or at least not the negative measure they might be in the unprogrammed world. On the other hand, there comes a point where the
interventions are so frequent that one might be forced to conclude either
that the program is not working in terms of improving the subjects' conduct
or else that it infringes unnecessarily on the already limited freedoms of its
clients.
Finally, there are interpretive uncertainties regarding the costs of the
programs. For comparative purposes in particular, it is crucial to determine
precisely the goals of the programs. In the prior studies this has not been
done. Is it strictly post-hospital treatment and monitoring we are concerned
with or are we also counting the effects and costs of institutionalization? Is
the average time of institutionalization at all shortened by the availability
of systematic community control and care, or are we dealing with supervision
arrangements and costs that are entirely supplementary to institutionalization
norms for acquittees?3 91 Figures have been thrown around to the effect that
the cost per patient of the programs is "only" $3000-4000 annually, but to
assess the significance of these estimates we must first have the answers to
the questions above. In addition, there are more remote costs that must be
considered: criminal justice processing and possibly incarceration costs for
those acquittees who return to crime; revocation process and institutional

391. Steadman, supra note 376, at 44-45, notes that the average length of institutionalization
for insanity acquittees in Oregon is 363 days versus 670 days for New York's acquittees,
suggesting that the emphasis on outpatient care in Oregon cuts into the time acquittees are
hospitalized. He concedes, however, that the comparison is flawed, as New York's acquittees
are charged with far more serious crimes. The true comparison, absent other intervening changes,
would be of Oregon acquittees before and after initiation of the PSRB's operations. The data
for this comparison are not presently available.
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care costs for those who need to be rehospitalized; and the costs of special
monitoring services and personnel, such as those incurred to support the
workings of Oregon's PSRB. Some of these costs may be very difficult to
pin down with any precision, a problem that is compounded when they are
compared to equally elusive costs that are incurred in jurisdictions without
systematic post-verdict treatment programs for acquittees. Perhaps only the
roughest of projections are possible, but the researchers' obligation is to at
least alert policy makers to the existence of these hidden costs.
3.

The costs of future research

It is evident that there are major obstacles to the conduct of research that
will yield valid, generalizable results upon which policy makers may depend.
The contaminating effects of the real world that inhibit meaningful comparisons among established programs, or between the programs and states
operating without special programs, are difficult and very costly to overcome.
In the case of some critical measurements, they may be impossible to
surmount. The variables are many and the numbers in the programs are
small. Setting up experimental situations that control for these impediments
to research is likely to be correspondingly difficult and costly, if not unethical.
Not only are the numbers of acquittees in the special programs small, but
the total offenders of such legal status is comparatively insignificant nationally. For example, a recent study shows that in 1978, only some 1,625
92
offenders were committed to mental institutions throughout the country.1
The small total size of the acquittee population may present an obstacle of
a different dimension: it may make the methodologically intricate and costly
research that is necessary for the production of valid results unfundable.
Even while conceding the major symbolic and philosophic importance of the
law's treatment of defendants who raise and succeed with the insanity
defense, those who control the research grants may conclude that money is
better spent on the study of law and institutions involving larger numbers
of persons.
If the requisite financial support for a major, definitive research project
on the post-verdict treatment of insanity acquittees is not forthcoming, there
remain a number of second-choice alternatives: (1) it is both possible and
worthwhile to further analyze the data available so far on the special acquittee
programs, including perhaps a more careful and limited comparison with
data on untreated populations; (2) additional research on the programs is
presently in progress under the direction of those who did the earlier work
and it deserves the research community's continued support and attention
and; (3) serious consideration ought to be given to funding discrete and

392. See Steadman, Monahan, Hartstone, Davis & Robbins, supra note 1. The overwhelming
majority of acquittees are institutionalized for at least a short period, despite legislation
authorizing their immediate release in some circumstances.
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relatively inexpensive supplementary research forays by researchers unconnected with the programs' administration and data analyses done so far.
The pay-off from such efforts in terms of adding to our knowledge and, no
less important, increasing the credibility of the findings is likely to be high.
There is a distinct resemblance between such a piecemeal process of adding
to, aggregating, and integrating various strands of information on a common
subject and the formula by which intellectual and practical progress is
achieved in general. Recognizing this is to realize that loss of the ideal
research approach-the comprehensive, definitive project-is something less
than an unmitigated calamity.

